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I . INTRODUCTION
This Article is about boilerplate language located at the back of
contracts drafted by the world's largest law firms. The clauses in
question are process provisions that regulate the amendment of
sovereign debt contracts . The se paragraphs have been drafted and
redrafted by generations of corporate lawyers , yet they have changed
little in their broad outlines in more than a century of use. Now they
take center stage in the global financial arena, where they govern
billions of dollars (and pounds, euros, and yen) of sovereign debt in
default and billions more in imminent risk of default . Officials ,
academics , and even some of the lawyers who drafted the clauses now
want the clauses removed because they make defaulted debt difficult
to restructure .
How did this arcane preserve of the bond lawyer come to be the
cutting edge in the evolution of international financial architecture?
Whereas private debt defaults lead to bankruptcy, sovereign debt
defaults lead to informal, often l engthy standstills . The creditors can
wait out the period of distress, expecting eventual economic recovery
to lead to a resumption of payments. But, for the most part, payment
resumption requires that creditors come to the negotiating table to
rewrite the defaulted debt contracts . Such a "composition" or
"restructuring" scales down the sovereign's obligations and causes it to
return to health quickly. In theory, this makes both the sovereign and
its creditors better off.
There are practical barriers to be overcome before a
co mposition can be concluded. These stem from information
asymmetries, from coordination problems, or from complex bargaining
dynamics . Sovereign compositions tend to be tripartite negotiations.
In addition to the sovereign and the existing creditors, international
financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
come to the table holding out new loans. In theory, these loans are
conditional, requiring the sovereign to reform its economic policies and
the unpaid creditors to share the pain by cutting back their claims to
induce lending that facilitates economic recovery . In practice, the IMF
often acts precipitously, bailing out the sovereign so as to stabilize the
international financial system or satisfy some other political goal of its
major shareholders . The prospect of a bailout diminishes the creditors'
incentive to come to the bargaining table to make concessions.
Assuming bargaining commences, the bond contracts contain
boilerplate clause s, called "unanimous action clauses" (or "UACs"),
that erect a barrier to success . These clauses, which condition

4
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amendment of the bond contracts' key payment terms on unanimous
bondholder consent, govern the majority of sovereign bonds
outstanding. A minority of bond contracts contain "collective action
clauses" (or "CACs") , which permit across-the -board amendments with
a three-quarters majority. Whereas CACs facilitate restructuring of
the defaulting sovereign's debt, UACs stand in the way. With
thousands of bondholders dispersed around the globe, coordinating a
unanimous vote is difficult, if not impossible. Further, a unanimous
vote requirement invites free riding: Because the transaction makes
the group as a whole better off, an opportunistic bondholder has an
incentive to "hold out"-to withhold its essential vote in hope s of
procuring a side payment from the transaction's proponent s .
The cumulation o f frictions has l e d t o calls for the institution of
a sovereign bankruptcy regime. This would resemble corporate
b ankruptcy reorganization, albeit tailored for sovereign debt. The IMF
has proposed a minimal bankruptcy architecture, one that would
trump UACs and facilitate restructuring in a majority action
framework. The United States Treasury agreed on the nee d for
majority action, but has registered a contractarian objection to the
IMF's plan for a new statutory scheme: Since UACs lie at the core of
the problem and UACs are contract terms, the solution lies in
persuading the market to rewrite sovereign bond contracts rather
than in overriding them with an international mandate. Now that the
official sector refuses to bail out every sovereign in distress, Argentina
being the most prominent example, UACs constitute less of a strategic
advantage . On the assumption that CACs are otherwise superior to
UACs in terms of efficiency, the Treasury projects that sovereign
bondholders will willingly exchange their UAC bonds for CAC bonds,
ameliorating the coordination problems. Sovereign debt restructuring
can then go forward in a framework of free contract .
Sovereign bondholders and sovereign borrowers at first
rejected both proposals-the IMF's bankruptcy plan and the
Treasury's spontaneous bond exchange suggestion. These real parties
in interest preferred the status quo . But their motives were suspect.
To the extent that the status quo m akes unconditional IMF bailouts
more likely, the sovereigns and their lenders have reason to oppose
reform, whether mandatory or contractual . 1 Official sector pressure
l.
For a recent overview of the "financial architecture debate," see Barry Eichengreen,
Res truct uring Soveriegn Debt: Analytl:cal Issues and Polic), Proposals, J. ECON . PERSP.
(forthcoming Fall 2004); Peter B. Kenen, The In ternational Fi nancial Arch itecture: Old Issues
and Ne w Initiatives, 5 10JT'L FIN. 23, �6 (2002); Marcus Miller, Postscrip t Sovereign De b t
Restructuring: New Articles, New Controcts-Or No Change?, i n SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS,
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has since broken the pattern of universal market OpposItIOn. A
handful of sovereign issuers have successfully departed from market
practice and include CACs in new bonds . The present question is
whether this development heralds a market-wide shift to CACs as
advocated by the Treasury.
This Article inquires into the causes of this multiparty dispute.
It takes a new look at the economics of sovereign lending, identifying
interests fundamental to the sovereign debtor-creditor relationship
that have been ob scured in a debate focused largely on opportunism
occasioned by IMF bailout lending. This different focus leads us to
identify unsound premises on both sides of the dispute between
contract and mandate .
The contractarians propound a "free lunch" theory of sovereign
lending. They assume that CACs are a first best improvement over
UACs, and that a transition to CACs holds out a surplus for all parties
to share. Unfortunately, no such twenty- dollar bill has been left lying
on the table . In our view, sovereign lenders rationally could prefer
UACs to CACs, and could do so even in a world without IMF bailout
lending. It follows, on a worst-case scenario, that engrained resistance
will prevent a voluntary, market- wide transition to CAC bonds, and
that a majority action regime may be achieved only on a mandatory
basis. On a best-case scenario, it follows that frictions will impede a
market transition from UACs to CACs. If the international financial
community wishes the incipient transition to become general and
remain stable, it will have to pay for it. Yet it is unclear where the
money would come from to pay UAC bondholders to trade their bonds
for CAC bonds. In the alternative, the IMF will have to intervene
aggressively, forcing model contract terms on sovereign borrowers by
threatening penalties for those who borrow with UACs . The best-case
scenario, thus characterized, is essentially mandatory intervention.
We accordingly agree with sovereign bankruptcy proponents
who doubt that the markets will spontaneously and quickly shift from
UACs to CACs once participants realize that bailouts are no longer
readily available . But we also suggest that the bondholder community
and the sovereign debtors have legitimate reasons for remaining
suspicious of bankruptcy proposals. The IMF's proposal rests on a
triad of majority action, cost savings, and administrative convenience
as it simultaneously attempts to address the need for a better
framework for bailout lending and to rationalize the process of
CRISES

AND RESTRUCTURING 183,

185 (Vinod K . Aggarwal

& Brigitte Granville eels .. 2003)

(describing the evolution of the conflict between the IMF and United Sta tes Treasury positions
since April 1, 2002).
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sovereign debt composition. These elements do not import a
persuasive normative grounding for a bankruptcy regime. The
economics of sovereign lending suggest a stronger, contract-based
norm-the best interest of creditors , 2 defined as whatever the unpaid
lenders freely approve. Under the norm, only the creditors themselves
should determine whether a given composition serves their best
interests. It follows that a sovereign bankruptcy process should not
attempt to replicate the transactional bias of American corporate
reorganization, where the need to close the deal can override other
concerns. In the sovereign context, the long-run interests of defaulting
sovereigns and their creditors are more closely aligned than those of
defaulting private borrowers and creditors . If sovereign creditors do
not like the restructuring on offer, it must be allowed to fail.
Under this view, a sovereign bankruptcy regime need do little
more than trump UACs with CACs and then leave the p arties to
renegotiate their contracts. With CACs in place (however imposed) ,
the p arties can b e remitted to the law governing their contracts-the
law of the State of New York in most cases-without nee ding the
as sistance of a bankruptcy infrastructure.
But one problem remains with this minimal approach, a
problem stemming from the contractual jurisprudence of s overeign
debt. 3 Once a renegotiation framework is established, a given
creditor's worst enemy may be neither the defaulting sovereign nor
the IMF, but another creditor or group of creditors with conflicting
interests . The contract law of New York is undeveloped on the
question of whether sovereign creditors owe one another Ineaningful
good faith duties . The law of private debtor-creditor relations,
meanwhile, rej ects the sugge stion that creditors should owe duties to
one another, leaving the j ob of constraining opportunistic behavior
within the creditor group to the b ankruptcy system.4 Over a century
ago, however, in the period antedating the federal statutory
reorganization regime , intercreditor duties did exist. As we see it, the

As distinguished fro m the "best interests of creditors" as used in the j urisprudence of
2.
corporate bankruptcy in the United States. See infra text accompanying note 1 2 3 . Coming at the
problem from a different angle, economist Andrei Shleifer has also recently argued for a norm of
"the best interest of creditors . " See ANDREI SHLEIFER, WILL T H E SOVEREIGN D EBT MAR K ET
SURVIVE? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9493, 2003) .
The closest the economics literature gets to recognizing this point is Barry
3.
Eichengreen's observation that debtor-creditor negotiations have been quick to produce results
when the parties have shown good faith. Barry Eichengreen, Crisis Reso lu tion: Why We Need a
Krueger-Lihe
Process
to
Obtain
a
Taylor-Like
Res ult
5
(Apr.
29,
2002),
http ://emlab .berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/policyliiekrueger.pd£.
4.

See infra text accompanying notes 207 - 2 2 7 .
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matter of intercreditor e quity became cabined in the federal
bankruptcy reorganization regime after that regime appeared in 1 934.
Thereafter, state case law on intercreditor equity atrophied, replace d
b y a regime of contractual self-protection. A viable framework for
sovereign re structuring, whether contract based or encapsulated in a
bankruptcy regime, needs an adj udicatory authority willing to impose
good faith dutie s across groups of creditors .
The Article proceeds as follows . Part I I draws o n the economics
and practice of sovereign lending to assert that sovereign bankruptcy
proposals should not be driven exclusively by the bailout problem.
Reform proposals need to address the fundamentals of sovereign
debtor-creditor relationships that operate independently of IMF
intervention. These fundamentals help to articulate a contract-based
norm, the best interest of creditors.
Part III looks at the sovereign bankruptcy movement to show
that the best interest norm already has influenced its participants,
albeit implicitly. The most prominent proposal, that of the IMF, has
evolve d towards both minimalism and creditor involvement. Some of
what the IMF proposes to provide, however, is either unnecessary or
inimical to the creditors' best interests. Most importantly, it is unclear
that the IMF's involvement in the administration of such a system
adds anything of value to either the sovereigns or their creditors .
Part IV appraises the CAC versus UAC debate . Here we
encounter a puzzle: the persistent use for more than a century of
UACs in New York-b ased sovereign debt issues and CACs in London
based debt issues. A fre quent explanation of this puzzle centers on the
Trust Indenture Act of 1 9 3 9 , 5 which embeds the UAC in publicly
issued corporate bond contracts in the United States,6 therefore
implying that a path dependency constrains the drafting of New York
sovereign contracts. We reject this contract failure explanation and
propose instead a multiple equilibrium explanation. Under this
explanation, UACs and CACs are both rational solutions to an
intractable problem. The choice between the two entails trade offs ,
and is a matter of lender preference under uncertainty rather than a
function of an efficiency calculation. One factor leading lenders to
favor UACs is the lack of a good faith backstop, which results in a
need for self-protection. Holding out is the only weapon one has in a

1 5 U.S.C. § 77aaa (2000).
5.
For discussion, see Mark J.
6.
232, 250· 5 1 (1987).

Roe,

The Voting Prohibi tion i n Bond Worhou ts, 97 YALE L.J.
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world in which creditors motivated by side deals can Impose
suboptimal compositions by maj ority rule.
Part V proj ects that such side deals and giveaways will occur if
sovereign debt compositions are negotiated under CACs. Resolution of
these disputes, therefore, requires a robust good faith principle. We
draw on the history of corporate reorganization prior to the enactment
of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1 9347 to show that courts have
grappled with these questions before, intervening on e quitable
principle s .
II. RELATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
Discussions of sovereign debt reform have focused primarily on
what mechanisms can be borrowed from the corporate bankruptcy
context. Little attention has been p aid to the differences between the
economics of the two contexts and these differences' implications for a
sovereign bankruptcy regime. This part performs that task.s
A. Background

Today's sovereign default crisis follows from the growth of the
market for emerging country debt in the 1 990s. Between 1 992 and
1 997, credit flowed copiously into emerging markets, averaging $ 1 5 4
billion a year.9 But risk perceptions in the emerging country debt
market changed after a succession of financial crises-in Mexico in
1995 and then in East Asia and Russia in 1 997 and 1 998.10 Demand
for emerging market securities dropped to $50 billion per year in the
period from 1 99 8 to 2000. 1 l A full-blown crisis ensued in 200 1 , when
Act of June 7, 1 934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 9 1 1 , 912 (repealed 1 93 8) .
7.
INT'L MON ETARY FUND, T H E D ESIGN O F THE SOVEREIGN D EBT RESTRUCTURING
8.
MECHANISM-FuRTHER CONSIDERATIONS (20 02) (performing an analogous function in the
context of IMF policy and planning), http ://www. imf. org/external/np/pdr/sdrml2002/ 1 1 2 702.pdf.
In hindsight, much of this investment looks to have been overoptimistic, based on
9.
inadequate information about emerging nations' economic, political, and institutional p roblems.
See Guillermo A. Calvo, Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in E merging Markets,
LACEA
Presidential
Address
(Oct.
18,
200 1 ) ,
http ://www. depeco.econo .unlp .
edu. ar/jemi/2002/trabaj02.pdf. Lenders may have underestimated the likelihood of liquidity
crises and other economic distres s . Alternatively, they may have assumed that troubled
sovereigns would be bailed out by the IMF. See general ly Daniel K. Tarullo, Ru les, Discretion,
and Autho rity in International Financial Reform, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 6 1 3 (20 0 1 ) (arguing that
international organization into nation- states causes continuing global vulnerability to financial
crises), auailable at http://www .oup.co.uk/jielaw/hdbNolume_41 Issue_04/pdf/0406 1 3 . p df.
1 0 . J OSEPH E . STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 89-98, 1 1 9-27, 1 42 - 5 1 (2002) .
1 1 . John B . Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U . S . Perspective, Remarks at Institute
for International Economics (Apr. 2, 2002) , http://www .ustreas. gov/press/ releases/p02056.htm.
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Argentina, its economy in collapse, defaulted without the benefit of an
emergency credit facility from the IMF. 1 2 The flow of debt to emerging
market governments in 2002 slowed to under $ 1 2 billion-a trickle
compared to the flows of 1 99 2 - 9 7 . 1 3 This sovereign debt crisis follows
other emerging market (and particularly Latin American) defaults of
the 1 930s and 1 980s.
Argentina's default changed the rules of the game in sovereign
lending. In the mid 1 990s, emergency credit provided by the IMF (and
the United States Treasury) cured the liquidity crises of countries like
Mexico and the East Asian tigers. Arguably, a two-sided moral hazard
problem resulted. One defective incentive lay with the sovereigns.
Rehabilitation was achieved on an accelerated timetable thanks to the
IMF's financial backing. We susp ect that the IMF made these
investments less for the purpose of rehabilitation than for the
purposes of preventing contagion from spreading through the
international financial syste m and protecting its political interests .
The moral hazard problem of insured credit resulted . If the IMF was
going to come in with cash, prudent borrowing made no sense . The
second defective incentive lay with the private lenders . Some of the
IMF's emergency funding, provided to forestall further crises, went
directly into the pockets of banks and bondholders . Until the IMF
found a way out of this bailout trap , sovereign lending threatened to
become a high interest-low risk fre e lunch. 1 4
These incentive problems have been ameliorated in recent
time s . Defaults by Russia and Argentina terminated the expectation
that all large economies would be b ailed out. At the same time, the
IMF has conditioned loans to Ukraine and Ecuador, both suffering
liquidity crises, on bondholder concessions . 15 "Constructive ambiguity"
now describes the posture of the official sector, and private lenders
now proceed at their own risk. But amelioration does not mean
solution. 16 The bailouts of Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay in 2002 1 7

For more de tailed data on capital flows to emerging market eco nomies, see

INST. OF INT'L FIN.,

INC., CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES (2002).
12.
Arturo C. Porrzecanski, Dealing with Sovereign Debt: Trends and Implications, i n
SOVEREIGN D EBT AT T H E CROSSROADS 27-33 (Chris Jachnick & Fraser Preston eds., forthcoming
2004).

13.

See A Better Way to Go Bust, ECON01VIIST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 64, 64 (reporting the latest

sta tistics out of the Institute of Interna tional Finance).

supra note 9, at 649-51. discusses these problems

14.

Tarullo

15.

Id. at 650.

1 6.

For discussion, see

,

[d. at 6 31-32, 649-51.

in detail.
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mean that incentive problems persist. The IMF still has reason to s e ek
a means by which to force bondholders to participate in e mergency
rehabilitations , scaling down their claims as a condition to the
provision of emergency loans. A sovereign b ankruptcy regime looms
large as the means to this end.
What is good for the IMF also may be good economic policy:
Bondholder free rides on IMF bail outs are distortionary; l e n ders to
distressed sovereigns should do no better than they would h ave done
in the absence of an emergency credit facility. But it does not follow
that what is good for the IMF necessarily makes for good economic
policy: A bankruptcy procedure suited to the IMF's institu tional
preferences could also b e distortionary and costly if it made lenders to
a distressed sovereign worse off than they would have been in its
absence (and in the absence of IMF bailout lending) .
Just as b ankruptcy's superiority over contractual composition
cannot be assumed, nor can the IMF's cost-benefit perspective be
accorded automatic hegemony . 18 The IMF's perspective dominates the
discussion over bondholder obj ections .b ecause the bondholders are
dismissed as opportunists, who are simply attempting to sustain the
flow of rents from bailouts . This dismissal is precipitous.
Consideration also must be given to a new regime's impact on the
fundamentals of the sovereign debtor-creditor relationship, viewed
independently of the moral hazard problem stemming from the IMF's
interventions.
This Part assays the incentive structure of sovereign lending. If
law reform is to create value, it cannot model sovereign lenders only
as economic opportunists. They also must be viewed as lenders who
can take capital elsewhere if reform fails to address their concerns. We
describe this zone of concern as "the best interest of creditors."
B. Corporate and Sovereign Borro wing Compared

Borrowers and lenders are natural enemies, more likely to
conform to economic predictions of self-interest than human b eings in
most other relationships. Before the loan is made, the vulnerabilities
lie on the borrower's side . The borrower needs the credit that the
lender remains free to refuse. Once the loan closes, however, the
vulnerabilities shift. The borrower walks away with the lender's
17. For a discussion of these crises and the private and official sector responses, see William
R. Cline, "Private Sector Involvement": Definition, Measurement, and Implementation (Aug.
2002) , http ://www .bankofengland.co . uk/conferences/conf0207I cline . pdf.
1 8. See STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 1 95-2 1 3 .
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funds . Nine-tenths of the borrower's contractual expectations are
fulfilled. M eanwhile, the lender begins a contractual j ourney fraught
with exposure to economic risk and human opportunism. For
protection, the private lender relies on the legal regime that enforces
the promise to pay.
Sovereign debt is different. It presents a puzzle, for the
sovereign lender has no recourse to a reliable enforcement authority. 19
For the most part, sovereign obligations cannot be directly enforced in
the sovereign obligor's own courts .20 A century ago, gunboat diplomacy
by creditor governments sometimes took the lawsuit's place . 2 1 But the
gunboats have been mothballed. Now the sovereign creditor's only
direct recourse lies in the courts of countries like the United States
and the United Kingdom, which by statute have relaxed the
traditional sovereign immunity barrier.22 But an unpaid lender takes
up this enforcement opportunity only in the exceptional case. Going to
court in a G-7 (or similar) country is beneficial only if the lender
identifies property of the defaulting sovereign in that j urisdiction (or
in another j urisdiction willing to levy execution on the first
jurisdiction's judgment) . And defaulting sovereigns try their best not
to leave valuables lying around.
Even if an avenue of direct enforcement opens up, the
sovereign creditor is at a disadvantage relative to its corporate
counterpart. Unlike a defaulting corporate borrower, a sovereign
cannot be liquidated. Nor can a composition that scales down a
sovereign's obligations to a manageable level be effected at the
expense of an equity interest, as occurs in corporate reorganizations.

1 9 . See, e . g . , Charles Lipson, The IJl;IF, Co m mercial Banhs, and Third World Debts, i n DEBT
AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 3 1 7 , 322-23 (Joshua D. Aranson ed., 19 79) (describing the
central puzzle in sovereign debt as that of why "so many states, with such diverse political
structures, continue to service debts in spite of the political and social costs") .
20. See Hal S. Scott, A Banh ruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors, 37 INT'L LAW. 103, 1 1 617 (2003) .
2 1 . See, e.g., Paul de Grauve & Michael Fratianni, The Po litical Economy of International
Lending, 4 CATO J. 147 , 1 5 8 ( 1 984) . The assertion that gunboat diplomacy played a role in
inducing countries to pay their debts has been challenged forcefully in a recent book by political
scientist Mike Tomz, who says that the primary reason that countries repay debts is in order to
maintain or improve their reputations. See Michael R. Tomz, Sovereign Debt and International
Cooperation: Reputational Reasons for Lending and Repayment 1 2 -48 (Oct. 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). The fear of sanctions, according to Tomz, has never been a
primary motivating factor for sovereign debt repayment. Id. at 49-79.
22. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U . S . C . § § 1 3 30, 1 3 32(a)(4) , 1 39 1 (f), 144 1 (d), 1 6021 6 1 1 (2000) ; State Immunities Act, 1 9 78, 26 & 27 Eliz. 2 , c. 33, reprinted in 17 I .L.M. 1123
(1978).
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The sovereign's citizens are its equity interest and its debt deals do
not contemplate their being "wiped out" for the benefit of creditors . 23
The lender's powerlessness leaves the sovereign borrower with
a disincentive to pay, and the borrower will default whenever the
expected value of future financing falls below its present debt
servicing costS . 24 Even though the sovereign debt contract is drafted to
address and facilitate the possibility of conventional enforcement, the
contract does not come close to guaranteeing that a sove reign able to
pay will perform its promise. Unlike corporate borrowers, sovereigns
do not necessarily default because they cannot pay. Whereas corporate
defaults follow from the exhaustion of resources, sovereign defaults
can be acts of political will . Sovereign distress can ripen into default
when actors in the national government decide that the tax burden
and administrative costs of debt service are intolerable and that the
burden of payment (political as well as economic) outweighs the costs
of default.25 For example, only one of the nations in default in the
Latin American debt crisis of the 1 980s owed as much as 1 percent of
gross national product . 2 6
Why, then, do lenders extend credit to sovereigns? The answer
is that sovereigns try hard to p ay. As a practical matter, their defaults
tend
to
presuppose
economic
reverses,
whether
due
to
mismanagement or bad luck. Sovereigns rarely repudiate their debt
contracts in whole . Defaults are partial, leading to the rescheduling of
obligations and, in some cases, their reduction.27 Historically, defaults
by sovereigns have been common even as sovereign loans overall have
been profitable . 28 Consider Eichengreen and Portes' figure s on
sovereign issues of the 1 92 0 s . Coupons were 7 to 8 percent. Defaults
lowered actual rates of return to 5 percent for London issues and 4 . 6
percent for New York issues. United States Treasury bonds yielded 4. 1
23. See Jeremy Bulow, Debt and Defmott: Corporate vs. Sovereign, in N EW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF MO N EY & FINANCE 579 (Murray Milgate & John Eatwell eels., 1992) (setting forth
the most striking differences between corporate and sovereign bankruptcy as being in terms of
"collateral, control, and continuity'') .
24. John NLt�Jllard Keynes, Foreign Investment and National Advantage, NATION &
ATH ENEUM, Aug. 9, 1924, at 584, 585.
25. Jonathan Eaton, Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts, 4 J.
ECON. P ERSP . 4 3 , 48·49 (1990).
26.

That country

was

Chile . See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting

Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155, 156 (1989).
27.

See Lee C. Buchheit, Of Creditors, Preferred and Otherwise, INT'L FIN. L . REV., June

1991, at 12 (discussing sorting of creditors in the course of restructuring).
28. Kenneth Tvi. Kletzer & Brian D . Wright, Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter, 90 AM.
ECON . REV. 621, 621 n.1 (2000) (citing study by Lindert and Morton of 1552 sovereign issues of
ten governments from 1850 to 1983).
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p ercent during the period . Although defaults were fre quent, outright
repudiations were rare , and payments in abeyance recommenced as
distress passed.29
The historical p attern implies that default causes negative
conse quences to sovereigns . Defaulting sovereigns eventually must
return to the credit markets . 30 The need for continued access to credit
imports an incentive to pay. At the same time, the enforcement threat,
built into the debt contracts but rarely used in practice, imposes a
residuum of costs .
Economic accounts of sovereign debt relationship s formalize
this description. Armed with their analysis, sovereign debt looks less
paradoxical .
C. Theories of So vereign De bt

The economics of sovereign debt builds on the following axiom :
Unless default imposes costs on the debtor, not only will the debtor
not pay the debt, the lender will not make the loan in the first place .3 1
As the cost of default decreases, so does the sovereign's borrowing
capacity. Contrariwise, as the cost of default increases, it at some
point becomes so high as to foreclose strategic default. 32 Strategic
default is an opportunistic breach stemming from the debtor's desir e
t o siphon off the payment flow o n the loan for another purpose. I n
contrast, distress default describes a default following a n
unanticipated shortage of resources due to an external shock o r other
misfortune. Distres s defaults are more excusable than strategic
defaults.33 To the extent either is costly, default entails welfare losses
for the debtor and its economy. Despite this, an increase in default
costs can be efficient if it encourages lending by discouraging strategic
defaults. 34

29. Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation, and
Readjustment During the Interwar Years, in T HE INTERNATIONAL D EBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 12, 27-29 (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds . , 1989) .
30. Herschel 1. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Sovereign De b t as a Contingent Claim:
Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Repu tation, 78 AM. E CO N. REV. 1088, 1088 (1988).
3l. Gabrielle Lipworth & Jens Nystedt, Crisis Resolu tion and Pri vate Sector Adaptation,
IMF STAFF PAPERS, SPECIAL ISSUE: IMF ANNUAL RES. CONF., Vol. 47, 2001 at 188, 192, 195.
32. Id. at 195 .
33. The notion of excusable versus non-excusable defaults is modeled in Grossman & Van
Huyck, SLtpra note 30.
34. Contrariwise, if a decrease in the cost of default is welfare maximizing, default is too
expensive . Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31, at 199.
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Within this framework, economists debate two explanations of
sovereign debt: a reputation theory and an enforcement theory. There
is evidence to support both.
1 . Reputation Theory
The dominant view is that the primary cost of default to the
sovereign is exclusion from future borrowing. Assume that national
economies are cyclical and that people prefer to consume evenly across
the cycles . It makes sense for the state to borrow on the downward
cycle to fund consumption and repay the loans with returns generated
on the upward cycle. The cost of default on the upward cycle is the cost
of being shut out of the credit markets and associated consumption
constraints on the next downward cycle. If default means an e mb argo
on future finance, the sovereign preferring smooth consumption pays
its loan. The only state that repudiates its debt is the state that never
plans to borrow again.35
More generally, whether in strategic or distress default, the
defaulting sovereign converts a gain to itself. Default triggers a lender
embargo. The debtor ends the embargo by transferring the converted
surplus to the lenders . So long as this recompense is made, the
moratorium can be short .3 6
If we assume that the debtor has a high-powered incentive to
regain access to the credit market, then the lender's problem lies less
with the default itself than with the possibility of opportunistic
behavior on the part of other lenders . A lender with no exposure to the
defaulted debt could break ranks with the unpaid lenders, ignore the
moratorium, and make a new loan to the defaulting sovereign. To the
extent a new source of credit is available, the sovereign's incentive to
35. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Deb t with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and
Emp irical Analysis, 48 REV. E CON. STUD. 289, 289-90 ( 1 9 8 1 ) . Mo i-e elaborate articulations of this
reputational model open up the class of defaults to distinguish between strategic and distress
situations and expand the lenders' behavior pattern to allow for the possibility of forgiveness. A
strategic defaulter that turns out to need future credit is "myopic." When it sees its mistake, it
becomes "nonmyopic ."
It signals its transformation by repaying the defaulted loans.
Readmission to the credit markets follows. Harold L. Cole et aI. , Default, Settlement, and
Signalling: Lending Resump tion in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 INT'L E CON. REV.
365 ( 1 995) ; see also Tomz, supra note 2 1 , at 18- 2 1 (describing how sovereign lenders who default
can reenter the lending markets by incurring the high cost signal of repaying their earlier debts
and showing themselves to no longer be "lemons") .
36. Kletzer & Wright, supra note 28, at 6 2 1 . The credit inflows to Latin America in the
early 1990s in the wake of Brady restructurings provide a good example of this. CHARLES W.
CALOlVlIRIS, How TO RESOLVE THE ARGENTINE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub .
Pol'y Research, Papers and Studie s, 2001), at http://www.aei. org/publications/pubI D . 1 4 869/
pub_detail.asp.
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reach a composition with its unpaid lenders diminishes. Ironically, the
reputational mechanism returns to working order only if the original
lenders p ersuade the soverei gn borrower to cheat the interloping
lender . 37 With the interloper thrown into the composition process with
the other unpaid lenders, the stick of refusal-to-lend held by the
lenders once more becomes a cost to the sovereign borrower. 38
2 . Enforcement Theory

The contrasting model is built around indirect sanctions. The
theory is that a sovereign might rationally repudiate its debts even
though it still needs a future source of finance to smooth consumption
in downward cycles. The model depicts a sovereign at the end of an
upward cycle. It possesses a c ache of c apital with which to pay the
debt incurred on the previous downward cycle. The model suggests
that the solvent sovereign has a choice. It can either pay the debt or it
can default and invest the capital in an insurance contract designed to
protect it against the next downturn. When this investment
opportunity is available, the rational sovereign will default because, in
the long run, saving and investing has a higher return than borrowing
and repaying. When saving and investment of the purloined capital
accompany the default, the sovereign grows faster, increasing its
consumption with every turn of the cycle . 3 9 It follows that sovereign
debt cannot be sustained on pure reputational enforcement. The
lender must have some additional means by which to inflict financial
costs on the defaulter.40
But is the enforcement model "robust to institutional detail?" �l1
Its authors admit that sovereigns in default leave no obvious assets in
plain view abroad for fear of creditor attachment. They argue,
however, that this exercise of international creditor evasion carries
37. Kletzer & Wright, supra note 28, at 622.
38. The importance of creditor coordination in order to discipline mavericks who were
tempted to lend to the sovereign in default during the mid- 1 9th century is described in two recent
papers. See Mark L.J. Wright, Reputations and Sovereign Debt (Sept. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors); Mark L.J. Wright, Sovereign Rish and Creditor Coordinat ion
(May 200 1) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
39. William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State
Debts in the 1840s, 86 AIvr. ECON. REV. 259, 267 ( 1 996) . If the debtor has no place in which to
invest, the reputational concern causes it to honor the debt. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe,
The Role of Ins titutions in Rep utation Models of Sovereign De bt, 33 J . MONETARY ECON. 45, 47
( 1 995) .
40. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 2 6, at 1 5 8 ; Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Ro goff, Sovereign
Debt: Is to Forgive to Forge t? 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 46-47 ( 1 989) .
41.

Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 40, at 43.
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indirect costs . With the sovereign in default, foreign trade must be
conducted in roundabout ways. For example, the sovereign loses
access to short-term trade credits like bankers' acceptances, and when
the sovereign places an asset abroad, a costly dummy entity must be
used. Even if the costs of evasion are small in relation to GNP, the
costs still loom large enough in comparison to the defaulte d interest to
make repudiation inconvenient: According to the model's proponents,
even if the costs of default do not exceed 5 percent of total trade, few
countries show a net gain on debt repudiation.42 Opponents, however,
argue recent debt crises have yielded little evidence of lender
interference with the trade of defaulters .43 Moreover, it is not- clear
why the lenders would want to interfere with the trade of defaulting
debtors, especially in distress defaults. Choking the debtor's trade only
prolongs the distress and further delays the payment stream.
Historians have found evidence to support both theses .44
3. Implications for Sovereign D ebt Restructuring

There is enough evidence in favor of each model to suggest that
both figure into the real world dynamics of sovereign debt. Indeed, the
situation is dynamic and recent litigation developments could create
new opportunities for bondholder enforcement.45 Below, we note some
differences in the normative implications of the two models .4 6
On a reputational model, the law has a limited contribution to
make in solving sovereign debt crises. The defaulting sovereign has an
ince ntive to present a plan of composition and lobby creditors for
approval . Creditors themselves define the "best interest of creditors"
as they approve or rej ect the sovereign's offer. The cost of default
derives from the sovereign's long-term interest in credit market

42 .
-13.

Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 26, at 1 5 8-59, 1 67, 1 7 4-75 . .
Kletzer & Wright, s upra note 28, at 622 ; see also Tomz, supra note 2 l .

44. Compare English, supra note 39 (arguing that defaults of American states during the
1 840s sup port the reputational model), with .J ames Conklin, The Theory of So vereign Debt and
Spain Under Philip II. 1 06 J. P OL ECON. 483 (1 998) (arguing that the history of the 1 6th century
relationship between the Genoese bankers and the Spanish crown supports the enforce ment
model) .
45. See in/i-a notes 1 0 9, 1 1 l .
46. Ro goff and Zettel meyer note a difference in the models' bearing on the current crisis in
KENNETH ROGOFF & ,J EROMIN ZETTELlvIEYER, E ARLY IDEAS ON SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY
REORGf\NIZATION: A SURVF:Y (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/57, 2002) . They assert
that under a reputational model the introduction of a bankruptcy regime will only have the
mi nor effect of causing some loss of reputation to the sovereign choosing to invoke it. Under an
enforcement model, in conh-ast. it is clear that the structure of the b a nkruptcy process matters a
great deal .
.
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access, not from a legally established enforce ment structure. Legal
intervention thus must be j ustified by reference to frictions, such as
coordination problems, that create barriers to otherwise beneficial
compositions
On an enforcement model, in contrast, the cost of default varies
with the enforcement device's effectivenes s . Costs of default could be
too high (greater debtor welfare loss than needed for the given
measure of creditor protection) or too low (default cost insufficient to
import an incentive to perform) . Coordination problems figure here
too, but in a more complicated way. There is again a concern about
transaction costs standing in the way of agreement. But these
transaction costs can play a beneficial role as well. Assume that the
costs of default stemming from a trade disruption or a credit
moratorium are too low, and that additional costs would have the
effect of deterring strategic defaults. On this scenario, a creditor
coordination problem that delays composition and extends the period
of economic punishment could be efficiency enhancing.
We note a point of ambiguity . Some economi sts assert that
although strategic defaults are a theoretical possibility, sovereigns as
a practical matter only default under identifiably bad economic
conditions.47 If true, it follows that the costs of default, whether due to
reputation or enforcement, are sufficient to import incentives to
perform . Indeed, defaults might cost too much.48 Other economists
assume that either strategic default or distress default is an active
possibility.49 If strategic defaults are pos sible , then the costs of
default arguably are too low . The choice between the two descriptions
is further complicated by the fact that no bright line test lets us assign
real world defaults to the strategic and distress categories .50 Recall
that even in a situation of manifest distress due to an external shock,
the ratio of debt to GNP can remain low enough to leave the sovereign
with the ability to pay. What looks like a "distress default" may
therefore follow from a political choice among costly courses of action.
So long as the sovereign has a choice as to whether or not to default,
strategy inheres in the fact pattern . 5 1
& Van Huyck ,

s up ra note

80, at 1088,

47.

Grossman

48.
49.

See, e.g., Lipworth

50.

This d ifficulty has concrete policy implic a tions. IlVIF planners, for example. are having

For an expansion on this point of vie w .

&

ystedt, supra

see

INT'L MONETARY FU�D, supra n o te

8, 'n 8.

note 3 1 . at 1 9 3 .

difficulty outlining terms for the activation of its sovereign bankruptcy procedure. See IXr'L
MONETARY FUND, supra note

5l.

8, � 'I 84-92.

The for egoing analysis implies a d ebt ceiling for each sovereign. Tbe

greater the

the greater the benefit of default an d the more likely default is signaled b�' the
borrower's cost-benefit analysi s . The total debt load sh o u l d not approach that leve l . E a t e n &

borrowed amount
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D. The Co mposition Bargain

Whatever a default's etiology, and whether our account focuses
on reputation, enforcement , or both, a question arises : Why do unpaid
creditors agree to take less than they were promised, instead of
waiting out the distress and insisting that the renewed debtor make
them whole?
For a simple scenario in which the debtor plausibly can
negotiate for a reduction in the interest rate or the princip al amount
(a "haircut") , assume an enforcement model. Assume also that the
lenders have a costly punishment available . Deployment of the
punishment is cost effective for the lenders but the exp ected yield is
less than the principal and interest owed. The borrower can come to
the table with an offer of compensation in exchange for the
withholding of the sanction. So long as the borrower offers more than
the creditors' expected return from the s anction, they will settle for
less than originally promised. 52 Further, the creditors cannot credibly
commit in advance to refuse to renegotiate.53
Now switch to a reputational model. The sovereign's overhang
of unpaid loans could discourage new investment. If the forgiveness of
some of the debt restores the incentive to invest, it can be in the
incumbent creditors' interest to make a concession. The new
investment benefits the sovereign's economy, while also making the
debt worth more than it would have been worth without the
concessions and the new investment. 54 This is called "the debt Laffer
Curve," because forgiving part of the debt increases the prospects for
repayment of the remaining obligation. 55
Compositions can occur prior to default as well as in the wake
of default. When a debtor with a current payment record experiences
liquidity problems, a composition can be the means to avert default.
The obj ective will be to delay near term maturities, stretching out the
Gersovitz, Sllpra note 35, at 289. The debt ceiling will rise, however, as the creditors'
enforcement devices make default more costly for the debtor.
52.
ECON.

Jonathan Eaton, De bt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts, 4 J.
PERSP. 4 3 , 50- 5 1 (1990).

53. Conklin, supra note 44, at 493-94. A proposed program of IMF funding conditioned on
creditor concessions would work similarly.
54. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Marhets with Imperfect
Inlormation, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405-06 ( 1 981) .
5 5 . Kenneth Rogoff, Symposium on New Institutions for Developing Coun try Debt, 4 J.
E CON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1990). Some question this explanation: with this free lunch sitting on the
table, one can ask why debt crises take so long to resolve. Creditor coordination problems may be
the reason. For an argument against the Laffer Curve in respect to Latin American borrowers in
the 1980s, see Eaton. supra note 52, at 46-4 8 .
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payment schedule and reducing the near term interest burden. There
will be a basis for trade with the creditors if, due to the liquidity crisis,
the debt is trading at a substantial discount on expectations that
payment in full will not be forthcoming. The composition relieves the
near-term payment burden and averts the risk of default. This creates
value because default carries collateral costs for both the creditors and
debtor.56 Pakistan, Ecuador and Ukraine all successfully negotiated
exchanges along these lines in the late 1990s. In the latter two cases,
the price of their bonds went up 20 to 30 percent . 57 Argentina and
Turkey followe d the same model in 200 1 .58
Ideally, a distressed sovereign restructures prior to default.
Avoiding default enhances the sovereign's reputation in the credit
markets and economizes on enforcement costs. Unfortunately,
liquidity crises often move more quickly than the adj ustment
processes and default proves unavoidable .
Multiple factors come to bear o n the composition bargain,
whether concluded before or after default. Clearly, adequate
information respecting the debtor's economy, financial condition, and
future prospects are necessary for the creditors to effectively apprais e
a n offer o n the table. The debtor comes to the table with some
bargaining power. Because money has a time value and the future
state of the debtor's economy remains uncertain, a deal promising the
resumption of p ayments after default can be attractive . Institutional
concerns also can incline creditors toward acceptance . On the other
hand, waiting has an option value. Any offer simply holding out an
increase in the price of bonds will not necessarily garner support.
Sweeteners may have to be added; for example , an increased interest
rate on the restructured debt to compensate for a repayment
deferral. 5 9 And even with a sweetener added, creditor coordination
problems can sour the deal.

5 6 . Among other things , the debtor that defaults on one issue will suffer an inability to
borrow, cross defaults on all of its bonds, loss of control of the process of restructuring, capital
outflows, and a general loss of confidence in its economy. All of this negatively impacts the price
of the b onds as well. Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 3 1 , at 200.
57. fd. Such dramatic increases may not occur again. The market, worried about hold outs,
was skeptical about the possibility that the exchange offers could succeed. Henceforth, prices of
bonds of sovereigns in impending distress will reflect the possibility of succes sful composition
prior t.o the exhaustion of liquidity. fd. at 2 06.
See, e.g. , Barry Eichengreen, Financial Crises and What To Do About Them 5 5 , 63- 64
5S.
(200 1) (unpublishecl manuscript, on file with authors) .

59.

fcl. at 5 7 .
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E. Coordinat ion Pro blems and Coercive Beha vior

Creditor coordination problems erect barriers to successful
compositions . To describe them, we take up the p articulars of today's
sovereign debt crisis .
Today's crisis holds out coordination problems more daunting
than those encountered during the 1 980s. In the 1 980s crisis,
unanimous assent to compo sitions at least was feasible because money
center banks held the bulk of the debt outstanding. Bank lenders are
repeat players , constrained to cooperate with one another. 60 But the
cast of characters changed in the 1 990s. The banks sustained
significant losses in the Latin American crises of the 1 9 80s, and
withdrew from a dominant role in sovereign lending. The sovereigns,
returning to the borrowing practices of the nineteenth and e arly
twentieth centuries, turned to the bond markets . The shift meant
larger numbers of creditors holding smaller claims . In mid- 1 999, for
example, Argentina had $ 1 1 1 . 8 billion of foreign issued bonds
outstanding and $ 2 9 . 6 billion of bank 10ans .6 1 The bondholders were
spread all over the world. Many were institutional investors, but there
also were also large numbers of small, individual investors
purchasers of bonds in retail "cookie j ar" offerings in Germany and
Japan.6 2 Such a heterogeneous group of creditors inevitably can be
expected to hold heterogeneous views about the debtor's ability to
pay. 63
Obtaining the consent of a multitude of creditors is partly a
matter of incurring costs (and retaining an underwriter and a proxy
solicitor) . But there also is a barrier in the contracts themselves. Of
Argentina's $ 1 1 1 . 8 billion of foreign bonds, 89 percent were issued

60.

For a description o f t h e workouts o f the 1 9 8 0 s . see Jessica W . Miller , Comment, Solving

the Latin A m erican So vereign Debt Crisis. 2 2 U . PA. J . INT'L ECON.

L. 6 7 7 , 6 7 9 -89 (200 1 ) .
E . Guido tti, On Debt ]vlanage m e n t a n d Co llective Action Clauses, i n REFORMING
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANC IAL SYSTEI'v1 2 6 5 , 2 7 1 tb 1 1 (Peter B . Kenen &
6l.

Pablo

.

Alexander

K.

Swoboda

eels .,

1 9 99),

ava ilable

at

http://www .utdt.eelu/�pguidotti/

on. elebt.ma nageme nt.and.collective .action .clauses.pdf.
62.

T he shift i n emerging market sovereign debt towards bonds is detailed in Mark

L . J.

Wright, Sovereign Risk a nd Creditor Coordination (May 2 0 0 1 ) (unpublished manuscript, o n file
with authors) . See o lso Philip J. Power , Note, Sovereign De b t: Th e Rise of the Secondary Marhet
o n d Its Implicat ions fo r Future Restructuring.>, 64 FOR D H AM
63.

L. REV. 2 7 0 1 ( 1 9 9 6 ) .

For this reason , i t makes n o sense for a debtor t o take the cash i t h a s reserved for

principal payments on defaulted debt ard repurchase

the debt on the market

at deeply

discounted pri ces. Once the market sees the buying activity, the price will rise to the reservation
of price of the creditor with the highest valuation. Ishac Diwa n
Adjustme nt, and Burden Sharing: A Unified Fm m e wo rl"
35-36 (19 92).

& Dani Rodrik , External De b t,

PRINCETON STU D . INT'L FIN. N o . 73, at
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pursuant to debt contracts containing unanimous action clauses.n4
These UACs are customary in bonds issued in the United States,
Germany, and Japan . 65 The remaining 1 1 percent of Argentina's
bonds were issued in London, where the drafting practice includes
collective action clause s . UACs invite free riding: Because the
transaction makes the group as a whole better off, an opportunistic
bondholder has an incentive to "hold out"-to withhold her vote in
hopes of procuring a side payment.66
UACs do not present an absolute bar to debt restructuring,
however. A composition can be effecte d by indirection. Instead of being
asked to vote on an amendment to their bond contracts, the
bondholders are asked to exchange their bonds for substitute bonds
that contain modified terms more favorable to the debtor. The
proponent of the substitute bonds neither expects nor requests
universal participation. Even so, the exchange offer does not close
unless it garners supermaj ority acceptance. Holdouts remain a
problem, however, because a free riding strategy remains available to
the bondholder opportunist even if no side payments are forthcoming.
To say no to an exchange offer is to hold on to your bond. You thereby
retain the debtor's original prOlnise to pay and all other contract
rights , even as the exchanging maj ority makes concessions . If the offer
succeeds, you benefit from the economic recovery, like the creditors
who exchanged their bonds, without having made any concessions .
Institutional bondholders known as "vulture funds" specialize in such
strategic behavior. They typically purchase their bonds on the

64. Guidotti, supra note 61, at 2 7 1 & tbl. l .
65 . The majority of sovereign bonds choose New Yark law; these include hoth bonds issued
in New York and E urobond issues. See, e.g., Peter Petas & Rashique Rahman, So uereign Bon ds-
Legal Aspects that Affect Default and Recovery, GLOBAL EMERGING MARKETS, May 1 99 9 . at 5 9 .
60 (finding that over 70 percent of sovereign Eurobonds are issued under N e w Yod� law) .
66. These UACs can also be described as lACs, or Individual Action Clauses. because they
grant bondholders individual rights. See generally Marcel Kahan, Rethinhl:ng COIporate Bonds:
The Trade- Off Between Indiv idual and Collectiue Rights. 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 040 (2002) .
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secondary market after the onset of distress at a deep discount,67
looking for short-term returns of up to 3 0 p ercent.6 8
If only a few creditors hold out, the exchange offer still
succeeds. Unfortunately, if enough creditors hold out, the exchange
offer will fail. More p articularly, if the subsidy to the holdouts is
greater than the increase in value to the exchanging creditors, every
one of them is better off by refusing to exchange. 69 The failure of the
offer then makes everybody worse off. Generally, in corporate
exchange offers, it takes supermaj ority participation in the exchange
offer-something more than 90 percent-to minimize the siphoning of
value to the holdouts and therefore permit the offer to succeed.70
The process can be manipulated for the borrower's benefit as
well. Suppose a debtor owes $ 1 00 and claims to have the resources to
support a payment of only $ 5 0 . Assume it makes a take-it-or-le ave-it
exchange offer-a substitute debt contract with a face amount 50
percent lower than the original contract . The creditors believe the
debtor can pay $70 and refuse to exchange, so the debtor tries again,
this time making the new debt offer senior to the debt in default. On
an enforcement model of sovereign debt, the creditors now accept the
offer, because failing to do so leaves them with a claim for $ 1 00
against an asset base that certainly will be less than $50.71
Alternatively, the sovereign could have the new debt secured by a
payment stream at its disposal. The addition of seniority or security in
the new issue imports an element of coercion.
Note that if the debtor makes a coercive offer considered too
low by substantial number of creditors, the holdout possibility benefits
the group as whole.7 2 On the other hand, covenants in standard

6 7 . The term "vulture" refers to the fact that these hedge funds typically purchase the debt
of companies and countries that are in financial distress and, therefore, have debt that is trading
at a deep discount. Although even the Institute of International Finance-the glob al association
of financial institutions-has publicly called for a targeted legal strategy to counter the
supposedly disruptive activities of vulture funds in the context of sovereign restructurings, these
funds are not without their supporters. See Vulture Hunt, FIN. TIMES, May 7 , 2002, at 20
(arguing that vulture funds serve to provide much needed liquidity in the markets for distressed
sovereign debt) , 2002 WL 202 9 8 1 84; John Dizard, A Banhrupt Solution to Sovereign Debt, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at 2 4 (arguing that there is nothing problematic about a vulture fund that
purchases sovereign debt at a deep discount and then sues to be paid in full), 2002 WL 3303702.
68. John C . Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Pro b lem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recap i talizations, 58 U. CHI. L . REV. 1 2 07, 1 2 1 4
(199 1 ) .
69. Roe, supra note 6, at 236.
70.
7l.

Coffee & Klein, supra note 68, at 1 2 0 7 - 1 4 .
Calvo, supra note 9 , at 1 3 .

72.

Coffee & Klein, supra note 6 8 , a t 12 23.
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sovereign debt contracts ("negative pledge" and "pari passu" clause s)
can be read to make the foregoing ploys ineffective by giving the non
exchanging creditors a pro rata right to the payment stream of the
new bonds. 73 If the creditors can sustain this interpretation, they can
attach the payments on the new bonds, and the coercive exchange
does not proceed.
Finally, sovereign debt contracts hand the borrower a weapon
to use against holdouts: the "exit consent ." The exchange offer is
combined with amendment of terms in the bond contract that protect
the bondholders but are subj ect to majority amendment . Under the
New York practice, payment terms are subj ect to UACs while
ancillary promises and process terms that protect the bondholders are
subj ect to CACs. As they exit, the cooperative, exchanging
bondholders approve an amendment that lifts the contract protections
of the holdouts . This leaves the holdouts with their original principal
and interest terms intact, but subject to manipulative action by the
debtor. For example, the pari passu and negative pledge clauses
described above may disappear through the exit consent process. For
the holdouts, the possibility of ever receiving full payment diminishes
with the loss of these protective provisions.74 Within the past few
years, exit consents have been used successfully by both Ecuador and
Uruguay. 75
F. The Best Interest of So vereign Creditors

Summarizing the foregoing economics and contracting practice,
we now describe the best interest of creditors .
7 3 , The use of pari passu and negative pledge provisions in this context-that is, where the
sovereign attempts to grant a new borrower senior rank or security in the form of an earmarking
of a specific payment stream for it-is very different than a vulture creditor trying to block
payments to others of equivalent rank who have proceeded with a restructuring. That latter
tactic, which appeared for the first time in the Elliott suit against Peru in Brussels in 2000,
depends on a questionable interpretation of the pari passu clause that most commentators
consider to be incorrect. See infra note 1 0 2 , The legal validity of that interpretation is beyond the
scope of this article,
74, On the use of exit consents to engineer a sovereign restructuring, see Lee C, Buchheit &
G, Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 70-82 (2000) ,
See also Michael M, Chamberlin, At the Frontier of Exit Consents, Remarks at the Bear Stearns
and EMCA Sovereign Creditors Rights Conference (Nov. 8, 2001), http://www.emta. org/
ndevelop/exitcons.pdf.
75. See Felix Salmon, Calm After the Storm, EUROMONEY, May 2003, at 1 00, 103; Felix
Salmon & Jorge Gallargo, The Buy Side Starts to Bite Bach, EUROMONEY, Apr. 200 1 , at 46, 5859; Uruguay: Exchange Co uld Ease Liquidity Problem, but Fiscal Adjustments Remain Key to
Restoring Solvency, EMERGING MARKETS RES, NEWSL, (J .P. Morgan, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 30,
2003, at 1.
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O n a reputation model , default amounts to a standstill that
endures until the sovereign (a) emerges from distres s , and (b)
determines that the benefits of renewed access to credit outweigh the
costs of making payments on the old debt. Agreement on a composition
can hasten reentry because scaling down the amount of old debt
increases the sovereign's borrowing capacity. When the sovereign has
a source of new borrowing to use in restoring its economic health, the
incumbent creditors have an additional reason to agree to take less.
But the floor on concessions is determined by the payoffs. If a debtor
demanded deep concessions but the creditors projected an anemic
economic recovery, then the creditors would likely reject the debtor's
demands.
In contrast, when the market value of the debt after the
composition is greater than the market value prior, the debtor and
creditor will bargain over a surplus. The allocation of the surplus
between the debtor and the creditors depends on a number of
variables, including information asymmetries and economic volatility.
But, at the bottom line, the sovereign must c ater to the creditors, since
it pays them only for the purpose of returning to their goo d graces.
Now shift to an enforcement model of sovereign debt. This
changes the variables but delivers us to the same negotiating table.
The borrower comes to the table because the default imposes costs on
foreign trade; costs that make it harder to get out of distres s . These
costs of default do not redound to the creditors' immediate b enefit,
however, even as they have to invest in enforcement initiative s . Their
unpaid bonds trade at discounts as a result . The double negative
costs on both the borrower and lender sides-creates room for trade .
These descriptions reveal a lot about the best interest of
creditors without suggesting that a bankruptcy regime would enhance
creditor welfare. This is because the models are populated by rational
actors and outcomes follow from the presence or absence of a surplus.
Given a surplus , the parties figure out a way to divide it, but given no
surplus, there is no deal and the creditors are better off waiting.
Within this framework, a bankruptcy system can be justified
three ways. First, it m ay help bring a surplus into existence. This
would be the case where unilateral creditor enforcement actions
prevented sovereign recovery without benefiting the creditors as a
whole. This also would be the case if the IMF and other official sector
actors decided that bankruptcy advanced their own purposes and
made submission to the constraints of a bankruptcy system a
condition to financial relief progrmTIs. Relief in the form of new
lending can contribute to the creation of a surplus, j ustifying the

2 004]

SOVEREIGN DEBT REFORM

25

bankruptcy regime. S econd, a bankruptcy regime may prevent a
surplus fro m being dissipated. This would be the case if enforcement
actions by creditors occurred frequently, causing costs of disruption to
outweigh the benefits to the creditors as a whole. Third, a bankruptcy
regime may overcome process frictions. Coordination problems could
make it hard for sovereigns to get the composition proposal a full
hearing. Even if compositions could be concluded without a formal
bankruptcy regime, a legally constituted and protected space for
renegotiation could, in theory, facilitate a debtor-creditor accord. By
helping the creditors cheaply determine their best interest, it could
make everyone better off. Alternatively, the dispersed creditors could
have a collective action problem. The sovereign might exploit this by
making a short duration take-it-or-le ave-it exchange offer designed to
allocate the majority of the surplus to itself. Finally, given debt
contracts containing UACs (and perhaps even with CAC contracts) ,
creditor opportunism in the form of holding out could prevent an
otherwise advantageous composition from garnering sufficient assent.
There is a distinction among the three j ustifications for
sovereign bankruptcy. The first and s econd justifications address the
maximization of a surplus, in both cases triggered by value- depressive
enforcement opportunities. Under a reputational model, neither
justification is available . The third justification, with its focus on
process and coercion, applies to both models of sovereign debt. To the
extent that the reputational model has the greater resonance in real
world practice, as we think has been the case up to now, the third
justification should shape the bankruptcy regime. On this theory,
sovereign bankruptcy should focus on solving creditor coordination
problems and protecting against debtor overreaching in the division of
the surplus rather than on containing creditor enforcement.
The best interest of creditors will vary with the circumstance s .
Where the sovereign i s poised t o recover, the best interest i s a
contractual arrangement that both restores the flow of payments and
restores the sovereign to good standing as a borrower. Other
compositions look toward rehabilitation at a future date. Here the best
interest lies in a composition that divides the surplus in a satisfactory
way, assuming the creditors deem the surplus to be adequate.
Whatever the situation, the composition that realizes the best interest
of creditors will follow from creditor assent. The goal of any sovereign
restructuring mechanism, therefore, should be to enable freely given
creditor assent.
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III. TOWARD MINIMAL BANKRUPTCY

A. The Poss i b le Regimes and the State of the Policy Debate

In Part III, we use the economic principles explained in Part I I
t o explain why the first o f the two major reform proposals, that of the
IMF, has failed to win support from either the creditors or sovereign
b orrowers . We begin by setting out the range of proposals and the
current state of the debate .
Sovereign b ankruptcy discussions contemplate four alternative
states of the world:
( 1) Fu ll Bankruptcy. This regime would be modeled on Chapter
1 1 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, but adjusted for the
differences between the private and sovereign debt context s . 76 Such a
regime would have four b asic features. It would: (a) stay enforcement
proceedings by creditors; (b) accord priority status to new debt
financing extended during the bankruptcy proceeding; (c) provide for
approval of a composition by a supermajority of creditors, trumping
contracts with UACs ; and (d) empower a judicial authority to cram
down a composition on dissenting creditors and classes, provided the
composition met a substantive standard, in cases in which the
supermajority approval was not met but a lower approval threshold
was satisfied.77
(2) Minimal Bankruptcy . This regime would eliminate any or
all of three elements of full bankruptcy: the stay, the priority for new
credit, and the cram down .7B Approval of the composition would

76. For a summary of the differences between them, see Tarullo, supra note 9, at 633-35.
For an expanded comparative perspective, see Patrick Bolton, Towards a Statutory Approach to
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons fro m Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World
(Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
7 7 . For full bankruptcy proposals, see Benjamin J. Cohen, De veloping-Country Debt: A
Middle Way, ESSAYS INT'L FIN. No. 1 7 3 ( 1 989) . See generally Kunibert Raffel', App lying Chapter
9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Eco nom ically Efficient Solution with a Hu man Face, 1 8
WORLD DEV. 301 (1 990) (drawing insights from Chapter 9, the United States ba nkruptcy system
for municipalities) .
78. For an academic proposal in the minimal bankruptcy mode, see Steven L . Schwarcz,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorgan ization App roach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956,
980- 1 0 1 0 (2000). For variations on the theme in policy briefs, see Anne Krueger, New
Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Sp eech at the
Institute for International Economics Conference on "Sovereign D ebt Workouts: Hopes and
Hazards" (Apr. 1, 2002), http ://www.imf org/external/np/speeches/2002/04 0 1 0 2 .htm; INT'L
MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, � 'll 6 - 1 4 . See also Christopher G. Oechsli, Procedural Guidelines
for Renegotiating LDC Debts: An Analogy to Chapter 1 1 of the U s. Banl�ruptcy Reform Act, 2 1
VA. J . INT'L L. 305 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Jeffrey Sachs, Do We Need a n International Lender o f the Last Right?,
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proceed under statutory rules, UACs would be superseded, and
dissenters would be bound. There would be little incentive to hold out,
unless a creditor had enough votes to block a maj ority.
(3) Universal Co l lective Action Clauses. All sovereign bonds
would have CACs . No international bankruptcy regime would come
into existence.79
(4) Status Quo . Market actors would continue to exercise
unfettered discretion in their contract drafting. 80
The cutting edge of the policy debate lie s between regimes (2)
and (3) above. Meanwhile , sovereign issuers and bondholders rej ect
regime (2) and frequently express a preference for regime (4) , but have
taken steps towards regime (3) . 8 1
The case for a bankruptcy mandate took a step forward when
Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, endorsed
Her proposal was criticized by
the idea in November 200 1 . 82
sovereigns and their bondholders alike for giving the IMF too much
control over future compositions . The IMF then went back to the
drawing board, reemerging on April 1 , 2002, when Krueger laid out a
more detailed proposal. The IMF made an emphatic move towards
minimalism, offering a sche me featuring more creditor involvement
and less IMF control. 8 3
The IMF's proposal has become the salient statement of the
minimal bankruptcy idea. Krueger argues that an international
b ankruptcy regime needs to perform five functions: The procedure
must provide (1) for confirmation by a supermaj ority vote of creditors,
voting as one class across the range of the sovereign's debt
instruments ; (2) for a stay of enforcement proceedings against the
debtor; (3) for priority status (and exclusion from the stay) for credit
extended to the debtor after commencement; (4) for a standstill of
debtor payments to creditors other than those extending new credit;
Graham Lecture at Princeton University (Apr. 20, 19 95) (on file with authors) . For a review of
the literature, see ROGOFF & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 46.
79. See Taylor, supra note 1 L
80. I n the economist's ideal world version of the status quo, there would be no more bail
outs and, therefore, no moral hazard problems.
8l. Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign De bt, INT'L FIN. L . REV. ,
May 2003, at 1 9 , 20-2 1 ; Dealing with Default, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at 63, 64.
82. Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at the National Economists Club Annual Members
Dinner (Nov. 26, 2001), http ://www . imf.org/external/np/sp eeches/2 001/1 1 260 l . htm [hereinafter
Krueger, IFA: A New Approach] ; see also ANNE KRUEGER, INT'L MONETARY FUND, A NEW
APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1 (2002), http://www. imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/exrp/s drm/eng/sdr m . p df [hereinafter KRUEGER, A NEW ApPROACH] .
83.

See Krueger, supra note 78.
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and (5) for reform of the debtor's economic policies. 84 The procedure
would vest gatekeeper authority in the IMF. A distressed sovereign
debtor would apply to the IMF for a standstill . The IMF would grant
the standstill only if the debtor is acting in "good faith" and is
committed to adj usting its debts. 8 5 Negotiation between the debtor,
the preexisting creditors, and the IMF would then proceed inside the
bankruptcy fra mework. A limited adj udicatory authority would be
created that would not pass j udgment on the substance of the plan,
but would resolve disputes within the group of creditors.
The contract versus mandate debate was j oined on April 2 ,
2 0 0 2 , when John Taylor, Undersecretary to the United States
Treasury, refused to endorse the IMF proposal, asserting that contract
reform remained the preferred mode for addressing the problem of
sovereign default . 8 6 If UACs were a problem, then the bondholders
themselves ought to be willing to trade in their old bonds for
substitutes containing CACs . With the exchanges effected, debt could
be restructured without the need for a bankruptcy process. 8 7
The bankruptcy movement has paused while actors variously
appraise the IMF proposal and the viability of the contractual
alternative . The IMF itself professes to be considering the contractual
alternative . 88 Indeed, internal IMF discussions respecting the design
of a sovereign bankruptcy regime have been gravitating away from
mandate and in the direction of creditor consent. 8 9 On another front ,
actors working under G - 1 0 auspices have devised new CACs adequate
to the task assigned by the Treasury . 90 Success for the contractual
solution, however, depends on the voluntary participation of sovereign
borrowers and lenders, and a significant segment of that community is
skeptical.9 1 The Treasury, apparently annoyed by the bondholders'
84. See KRuEGER, A NEW APPROAC H , supra note 82.
85. Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 1 1 ; Krueger, I FA: A New Approach, supra note 82.
86. See Taylor, s upra note 1 1 .
87. Id.
88. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Board Discusses Possible Features at a
Sovereign Debt Re structuring Mechanism (J an. 7, 2003), http ://www.imf.org/external/
np/sec/pn/2 003/pn0306.htm.
89. See generally INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8.
90. See GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G · 1 0 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES,
annex 1 (2002) , http://www .bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf.
9 1 . For early reports on the wariness of market participants about the variou s reform
proposals, see Alan Beattie, Financial Groupings Want Ne w Deb t Rules, FIN. TIMES, June 12,
2002, at 1 2 , 1 2 (reporting agreement among buyers and sellers on the sovereign bond markets
over unattractiveness of the IMF's statutory reform proposal) ; James Tyson, European Nations
Plan to Issue Sovereign Bonds with Ne w Clauses, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 9, 2002 (reporting
that while Germany, France, and thirteen other European countries are willing to introduce
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failure to embrace its contractarian accommodation of their interests,
responded with a p ublic tilt in the direction of the IMF proposal .9 2
This leaves the Treasury and the IMF occupying common ground,
simultaneously (and ambiguously) entertaining the possibility of both
approaches . Even so, the Treasury's message to the bondholders
seems clear enough : Get with our contractarian program or face
something you will like even less. These informal pressure tactics
have yielde d dividends, as Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, South Africa, and
a half dozen other countries have begun experiments with CACs in
their New York bonds . 93
We appraise the IMF proposal here, deferring our appraisal of
the Treasury's proposal to Part IV. Section B argues that the IMF
proposal is not minimal enough. This discussion draws on Part II's
presentation of the incentive structure of sovereign lending
relationships to assert that three of the proposal's features-the stay
of enforcement, the grant of priority status for new loans , and the
payment standstill-add little to the posture of a sovereign default
under the status quo . The value that the IMF proposal adds,
therefore, differs little from the contractual proposal. Both seek
majoritarian voting with the goal of facilitating bargaining and
rehabilitation. The difference lies in the means to the end-where the
Treasury would contract into CAC s , the IMF would mandate them .
Section C expands o n our argument for minimal bankruptcy by
explaining why the IMF proposal appropriately omits two central
features of the United States bankruptcy system-j udicial fairness
review of the reorganization plan and judicial cram down.

CACs, the Group of 24-including India and Egypt-have rejected the idea of CACs) . The initial
news on the proposals was not all bad though. Gradually, a critical mass of market actors came
to support the inclusion of CACs in new issues. Whitney Debevoise, The De b t Crisis Debate,
LATIN FIN . , Nov. 2002, at 52-54, http ://www. e mta.org/keyper/partingshotfinal l .pdf; see Ne w
Option Arises for Future Bond Launch, GERTA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Sept. 18, 2002 (reporting
Brazil's announced willingness to introduce CACs) .
92. See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard, Enhancing Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address at IMF
Conference on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms (Jan. 22, 2 00 3) (Chairman of Council
of Economic Advisers espousing contractarian approach while simultaneously endorsing the
benefits of an organized restructuring process).
93. John Barham, Coohing Up a Ne w Solution, LATIN FIN . , June 2003, at 10. As of the date
of this writing, the list also included Canada, Turkey, Belize, Guate mala, Panama, Venezuela,
and Kore a. The exception to this trend was Israel, which used UACs in its New York law
registration. For a recent report on this front, see INT'L MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT TO
THE I NTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON CRISIS RESOLUTION (2003),
http ://www .imf.org/ExternallNP/p clrlcr/200 3/eng/090503.pclf.
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B. No t Minimal Eno ugh

Krueger describes the IMF proposal in terms of the creditors'
best interests . She p rofesses three obj ectives : ( 1 ) providing incentives
for more orderly and timely restructuring; (2) protecting asset values
and creditors' rights ; and (3) reducing the costs of disorderly
workouts.94 M any third parties, we suspect, read the proposal as an
attempt to cure the problems that the IMF encountered in the b ailouts
of the mid- 1 990s. On this view, the best interest of creditors takes a
back seat to the IMF's immediate obj ectives-preventing contagion in
the international credit markets and transferring the burden of
restructuring to private creditors.95
1 . The Standstill and the Bail In
The third-p arty view better describes the proposal's intended
scope of operation. Consider the functions played by three of the
proposal's components-the stay of enforcement proceedings , the
standstill respecting payments, and the provision of priority for new
loans . This trio is supposed to come into operation as distress ripens to
default, encasing and ordering the process of emergency financing.
The obj ective is to transform the bail out into a "bail in." H ere is the
scenario. First, the sovereign with a liquidity crisis goes to the IMF,
which plays a gatekeeping role, distinguishing between applicants
genuinely in crisis and applicants able to pay and seeking to use the
bankruptcy safe space opportunistically. 96 Once the gate is opened
and the sovereign e nters the safe space, the liquidity crisis is eased.
Since a standstill is in effect, no default occurs and everyone stays
calm. With no payments due immediately, an emergency loan from the
IMF need not take first place on the agenda; instead, the preexisting
creditors must come to the table and agree to give -ups. Capital
controls also may be needed at this early point, the theory being that
capital controls imposed with IMF sanction and for a short p eriod of
time will have no perverse effects . Once the preexisting creditors take
their haircut, the IMF makes its loan from a priority position.

94. Krueger, supra note 78.
95. Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 31, at 1 90, ascribe a trio of objectives to the IMF: (1) see
private creditors share the burden of restructuring; (2) confine the damage of distress, protecting
the world economy; and (3) see that the international credit markets run smoothly.
96.

See Krueger,

supra

note 78.
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Liquidity restored, the short-term bankruptcy ends . Combining the
loan and the haircut, the debtor is creditworthy once ITlOre .97
This sounds reasonable , but questions arise about credibility
and perverse effects. The standstill is supposed to obviate the nee d to
avoid default with new borrowing, but, in substance, standstill and
default are the same thing. The literature points to only one point of
difference . Standstill imports a freeze on interest accruals9 8 where
interest continue s to accrue during the period of default under the
debt contracts as written. This distinction does not impress us. That
the interest meter stops clicking due to a statutory mandate does not
make a default any less of a default. Nor does it change the final
payment outcome . In the present system, the sovereign ready to
return to the credit markets negotiates a payment schedule for less
than the full amount. Interest accruals during the default appear
primarily as numbers in the page of rights to be scaled down. Their
existence is unlikely to make a difference in the negotiation's outcom e .
The standstill provision speaks more to liquid capital nervously
poised to exit the distressed j urisdiction than to the unpaid creditors.
Here the bankruptcy regime blesses the default with a legal sanction.
But it is not clear why, as between the status quo and the
hypothesized new regime, a different behavior pattern follows for
nervous capital that readily can be transferred to other national
venues . Capital controls aside, the aspect of the program most likely
to maintain calm in fluid capital markets is the prospect of an IMF
emergency credit facility.99 But the incentive structure implicit in the
proposal does not hold out an ex ante IMF commitment. Instead, the
preexisting creditors must make their give-ups under a threat that
IMF credit will be withheld. Any doubt on this score would be resolved
by capital flight, necessitating capital controls. It is hard to see how a
standstill declaration makes a difference.
Nor is it clear that preexisting creditors will agree to a quick
haircut. In the past, creditors have been incidental beneficiaries of
IMF emergency credit. If the IMF is going to make the loans anyway,
whether for political reasons or due to concerns about the
international financial system , then bondholders are better off holding

97. The closest analogue in practice is the prepackaged bankruptcy, an out-of-court
composition closed through Chapter 1 1 in order to take advantage of the Chapter's majority
voting scheme. Section 1 1 2 6 (b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 1 1 U . S . C . § 1 1 26(b) (2000), permits an
issuer to conduct a binding vote on a plan of reorganization prior to filing for bankruptcy. In
addition, 11 U . S . C . § 1 1 2 1 (a) allows a debtor to file a plan with its chapter 11 petition.
98. See Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 1 1 .

99.

ld. at 80 -83.
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out as a group. On the other hand, in cases like those of Ecuador and
Ukraine, where default carries no negative systemic threat and
emergency credit has been withheld, the IMF has a credible
bargaining position. But the IMF has that bargaining position
whether or not the negotiation is encased in a formal b ankruptcy
proceeding. Of course, the standstill stops the payment stream and
pressures the lenders, but an old fashioned default does that as well .
Moreover, the longer the standstill stays in place, the e mergency
proceeding designed to avert a liquidity crisis looks more like a
conventional , drawn out sovereign default . As such, it hardly would
have the effect of restoring confidence and preventing contagion .
The IMF's transmogrification of a "default" into "standstill,"
therefore , seems unlikely to persuade either nervous capitalists or the
lending community that financial distress is not financial distress.
Capital, not recharacterization, cures distress, leaving the IMF in
more or less the same position with or without a bankruptcy process.
2. Priority Lending

At present, the IMF effectively receives priority treatment from
its members-borrowers. Unlike private sovereign lenders, the IMF
does not consent to reductions of its payment rights . And, unlike
private lenders, it almost always gets p aid. lo o The IMF's priority
proposal , lOl then, merely formalizes and sanctions the present
practice, much like its standstill proposal, and would Inake a
difference only if used to facilitate new financing with private credit in
a manner similar to debtor-in-possession financing in corporate
bankruptcie s . This use, however, creates an appearance of conflict
with one of the basic tenets of the reputation theory of sovereign debt.
Recall that once the default occurs and the lenders are waiting for
recovery, the sovereign retains a repayment incentive only to the
·
extent that no third party lender appears on the scene holding out a
new credit line. The IMF priority lending proposal effectuates j ust
that result. 1 0 2
In other words, the extant creditors will not always want the
distressed sovereign to have access to fresh priority lending. It follows
that the incumbent creditors will want to decide on new priority loans

100. STIGLITZ, supra note 10, at 226.
101. See also INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8 , � 72.
102. The priority lending proposal, like the CAC proposal, requires a mandate that overrides
existing sovereign debt contracts. The contracts contain "p ari passu" clauses which make
priorities ineffective. See s up ra note 73 and accompanying text.
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themselves . In many cases, one would expect such consent to be
forthcoming readily, as all the creditors benefit when new financing
helps bring the sovereign's economy out of distress. 1 03 So long as the
debtor retains a good faith commitment to resuming debt service at
the e arliest opportunity, a priority emergency credit function should
not prove deleterious to the interests of the creditors as a whole. But
one should not expect approval in all cases. New priority loans hold
out risks to preexisting creditors . If the loan proceeds are badly
managed and the new capital does not assist the recovery process , but
instead, say, flows out of the country, then a priority credit facility
worsens the position of preexisting creditors .
We question whether IMF assumption of authority to decide on
new priority private lending should be included in a sovereign
bankruptcy regime. It does not serve the purpose of solving a collective
action problem. Of course, new financing could hasten the sovereign's
economic recovery. But the IMF's proposal merely shifts authority
from the creditors : Bond contracts already allow for the preexisting
creditors to permit fresh priority lending with a vote of either a simple
majority or two-thirds majority of the bondsJ o4 Since the IMF's
agenda often diverges from that of the creditors, this shift of authority
respecting priority private credit to the IMF would not be in the best
interest of the creditors. 1 05
3. The Stay
The IMF, still following the corporate template , includes a stay
of enforcement in its sovereign bankruptcy proposal . 1 0 6 In the private
context, the stay is e ssential. Direct creditor enforcement against
going concern assets tends to be value destructive, and the whole
purpose of corporate reorganization is the enhancement of going
concern value. It is less clear what benefits redound from a stay in the
sovereign context. At least one commentary suggests that it should be
dispensed with . 107 We agree , even as we note that the matter remains
arguable.
103. For a statement o f the importance o f new priority financing in respect o f sovereign
recovery, see Bolton, supra note 76.
1 04. For an explication, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the
Collective Will, 51 EMORy L.J. 1 3 1 7 , 1 345-46 (2002) .
105. This position recently has garnered support within the IMF. See INT'L MONETARY FUND,
supra note 8, �� 1 69-77 (proposing that new priority private loans require approval of 75 p ercent
of the preexisting creditors) .
106. Krueger, IFA: A New Approach, supra note 82.
107. Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 984-85.
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Direct enforcement of sovereign debt is the exception and not
the rule. Even the enforcement model of sovereign debt claims only
that creditors use indirect means to inflict costs on defaulting
sovereigns. We suspect the stay has found its way into the IMF
proposal in order to address a residual threat of enforce ment by
vulture funds . This came to the attention of the international financial
community as the result of an incident in June 2000. 1 0 8 Peru was in
the process of executing a payment promise made pursuant to a
composition reached with its creditors. Funds intended for holders of
European issues were dispatched in b anking channels. A hedge fund
that had been a holdout from the composition managed to identify, in
Belgium, monies headed to Frankfurt. The fund procured an
attachment from a Belgian j udge, ruling ex parte . The legal theory
was that the payment violated a covenant of the original bond
contract, which still governed the bonds belonging to the holdout .
Whether or not the theory would have held up in a more
knowledgeable court , 1 09 the ploy worked. Peru caved in and p aid the
vultures in full rather than have a settlement already reached with
the vast majority of its creditors disrupted by a drawn out legal
proceeding.
Since then, the threat of disruptive enforcement actions by
holdout creditors has been repeatedly offered to justify both a
sovereign bankruptcy regime and UAC reform . l l o Although the threat
has been utilized effectively in at least two other instances, I I I its
1 08. For a fuller description of the incident, see G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign
Piracy, 56 BuS. LAW. 63 5, 63 5 - 36 (200 1 ) . See also Eric Lindenb aum & Alicia Duran, Debt
Restructuring: Legal Considerations, EMERGING MARK ETS RES. (Merrill Lynch & Co. Global
Securities Research & Economics Group, New York, N.Y.) , Oct. 30, 2000, at 1 - 3 .
1 0 9 . See Gulati & Klee, supra note 1 08, a t 63 6-37, 65 1 (arguing that t h e argument was
infirm) ; Letter from Charles H. Dallara, Managing Director, Institute of International Finance,
to the Honorable Gordon Brown, Chairman of the International Monetary and Financial
Com mittee (Apr. 9, 2002) (stating that the consensus of legal experts is that the interpretation of
the pari passu clause in Elliott v. Peru (Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92
(Court of Appeals of Brus sels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000» was incorrect and suggesting a
strategy for reversing that interpretation), http ://www.iif.com/data/publiclicdc040 2 . p df.
1 1 0 . Most prominently, the actions of Elliott featured in Anne Krueger's speech on November
26, 200 1 at the National Economists' Club, where she discussed the IMF's statutory proposal.
See Krueger, IFA: A New Approach, supra note 82.
I l l . See Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seat ing Chart for Sovereign Res tructuri ng, 54
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing both the pari passu cases) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors). The attempt to utilize the pari passu argument has also failed in one
instance. See I\:ensington Int'l, Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2002 No. 1088 (Commercial Court,
Apr. 1 6, 2003), aff'd, 2003 WL 1935 493 (CA May 1 3 , 2003). As of this writing, the most recent
case, against Nicaragua, has yielded an initial decision for the vulture creditors and has an
appeal pending. See Angela Pruitt, Nicaragua Creditor Suit Muddles Sovereign Res tructuring,
Dow ,J ONES CAP. MARKETS RE P , Sept. 29, 2003.
.
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gravity is questionable . Peru was jumped unaware s In Belgium . It
seems unlikely that many nations making payments in respect of a
composition (or otherwise in a state of default) will be taken unawares
in the future . Payment channels can be structure d so that neither the
sovereign nor its agents is the titleholder to any monies passing
through unsafe territory, to the extent that passage through unsafe
territory is necessary at all. 1 I 2 Consider this in regard to actions by
Argentina in 200 1 , at a time of imminent default. Argentina and the
IMF worried about creditor enforcement actions in the United State s ,
where the Argentine government's bank reserves were sited. The
expedient was simple. The monies were transferred to the Bank for
International Settlements in Basle, 1 1 3 apparently a safe space. The
implication is that with advance planning, direct judicial enforcement
against sovereigns has limited utility. No easy sovereign analog exists
to the private law race to the courthouse.
On the contrary side, the enforcement model of sovereign debt
can be drawn on to support a stay. As enforcement proceeds indirectly
under the model, the sovereign incurs the costs of husb anding its
assets so as to frustrate direct enforcement. l 14 It follows that a stay
could assist the rehabilitation process, even if attachments are few
and far between. 1 1 5 The stay frees up the sovereign to engage in cross
border transactions without incurring the costs of subterfuge. To the
extent the enforcement model identifies costs, a stay imports benefits
to the sovereign.
Whether an appropriate balance of enforcement costs and
performance incentives would result from a stay is a more difficult
question: Would the IMF's proposal make sovereign default overly
attractive? The IMF in its gatekeeper role says "trust us." But it is
not clear that the IMF, in its stabilizing role, would manage the gate
in a way that maximizes the sovereign's incentives to pay its debts.
A final point that might cause suspicion towards the IMF
proposal is that, to a considerable extent, cre ditors already have

1 1 2 . Had Peru paid at home, in Peru, its bondholders would have been transferring a mongst
themselves in unsafe banking channels.
1 1 3. Eichengreen, supra note 58, at 89.
1 1 4. See supra text accompanying notes 39·44.
1 1 5 . The latest reports are that numerous bondholder suits have been filed against
Argentina , at least some of them hoping to use the arguments made by Elliott against Peru. See
Pamela Druckerman, Frus trated Argentine Bondholders Try Suing-A m b ition Is To Seize Assets
or at Least Gain Leverage; Why Managers Wait, WALL ST. J . , Aug. 23, 2002, at A6, 2002 WL-WSJ
3404256; see also Aaron Lucchetti & Jonathan Karp, Billionaire 's A ward May Snag Progress on
Argentine Debt, WALL ST. J . , Sept. 22, 2003, at Cl (reporting on a $700 million judgment
awarded to Kenneth Dart in his suit against Argentina), 2003 WL-WSJ 3980356.
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collective control over maverick creditor lawsuits. Maverick lawsuits
with the highest potential to cause a sovereign meaningful p ain are
those for accelerated amounts (as opposed to those for an individual
creditor's missed coupon payment) . An acceleration, however, typically
needs to be authorized by 2 5 percent of the creditors. And once
authorized, it can be reversed by a simple maj ority vote. 116
We doubt creditors believe that this segment of the IMF's plan
will solve either coordination or hold out problems . It merely shifts
authority from the creditors to the IMF; authority the creditors would
rather retain. These points appe ar to be getting through to the IMF,
as demonstrate d in recent internal discussions . It is considering
removing itself from the gatekeeper role . Memb ers in distress would
instea d activate the bankruptcy process by representing that their
The IMF also is considering
debt had become unsustainable . 1 1 7
dispensing with the automatic stay in favor of a requirement for a
three-quarters majority creditor vote. 1 1S
C. Majority Vo ting, Cramdown, and Fairness Review

Even though we question many provisions of the IMF
bankruptcy proposal, we believe it takes a step forward when it leaves
the determination of the fairness of the composition (the "plan" in
United States bankruptcy terminology) to the creditors, relegating any
adjudicatory authority within the system to a secondary role. Any
"cram down" of a restructuring plan thus would follow from the action
of a majority of the bondholders' peers rather tha n from a judge. 1 l 9
The omission of the judicial cram down will come as a jolt to
observers steeped in United States bankruptcy practice. Chapters 9
and 1 1 of the United States Bankruptcy Code both provide for
sub stantive review of the composition for fairness by a federal judge as
a precondition to giving it binding effect on dissenting cre ditors . 12 o

s upra note 1 0 4 , at 1 330 - 3 l .
l l 7 . This creates a problem respecting the case o f a member with sustainable debt that
triggers the process opportunistically. Various alternative approaches are under consideratio n .
See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8 , � � 84-92.
l l 8 . Id. �� 124-38, 167. Any creditor receiving proceeds of an e nforcement action would have
its bankruptcy payout proportionately reduced. Id. � 1 3 3 .
l l 9. See Schwarcz, s upra note 7 8 , at 1 003-09. Schwarcz stop s just short o f leaving out the
judge, suggesting that judicial cram down be held in reserve to be added to the system in case
the creditors fail to agree to compositions. Krueger, supra note 78, takes the additional step ,
separating the judge from the approval process, and limiting the j udge to intercre ditor dispute
resolution.

l l 6 . For an explication, see Buchheit & Gulati,

1 20. 11 U . S . C . §§ 943(b), 1 1 29 (a) (2000) .
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How could dispensing with judicial review enhance the attractiveness
of the process to the creditors? The exercise of working through the
answers to this question reveals the strengths of the IMF's minimal
bankruptcy scheme, even as it identifies some additional weaknesse s .
1 . The Best Interest o f Creditors a s a Judicial Standard
The IMF could articulate a fairness standard. Under this
Article's analysis, the "best interest of creditors" suggests itself as a
suitable standard for both simplicity and economic sensitivity. The
standard is easily stated: A composition realizes the best interest of
creditors when the creditors freely assent to it, induced by the fair
division of an adequate surplus. Applying the standard presents more
difficulties . This determination lies in classic "business j udgment"
territory. It is the creditors who know what rehabilitates the borrower
as creditworthy. It is the creditors who have the handle on the
magnitude of the surplus under negotiation . It is the creditors who
best know the difference between fairness and greed when the surplus
is divided at the negotiating table. Given this, vesting the decision in
the hands of an adj udicator suggests an ulterior, distributive motive.
Even if the subj ect matter was more justiciable, it is hard to
envision an actor who could determine the best interest of creditors
and impose that j u dgment on classes of dissenting cre ditors without
the risk of losing the confidence of actors in the credit markets . The
distributive, and hence political, consequences of this decision may be
of too great a magnitude for technocratic treatment. Even the
selection of the decision maker would present a public choice problem.
The IMF, the prima facie candidate, has, among other problems,
disqualifying financial stakes in the subj ect m atter. Experts could be
recruited, but would the context import sufficient reputational
constraints to prevent their falling prey to influence activities? 121
The creditors justifiably fear a tilted playing field-a
bankruptcy process that serves the purposes of the IMF and the
debtor, siphoning surplus to rehabilitation and repaying the IMF
rather than paying the creditors. The IMF appropriately alleviates
these suspicions by vesting decision-making authority in the creditors
themselves .

1 2 1 . Significantly, the IMF's proposal envisions an adjudicatory authority only for process
questions, claim validation, and intercreditor dispute resolution. INT L MONETARY FU ND, supra
note 8, �� 227-73.
'
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2 . United States B ankruptcy Compared
In the United States bankruptcy context, fairness standards
protect the creditors. In theory, the judge reviews the plan to prevent
wealth transfers in the debtor's direction. For example , consider the
"best interest of creditors" standard of Chapter 9, which governs
municipal bankruptcy. 1 22 With municipal reorganization, as with
sovereign default , 1 2 3 liquidation is not an option and local politics
create a prima facie possibility of strategic default. In addition, the
taxpayers are parties in interest; thus, Chapter 9 gives them a special
right to appear and obj ect to the plan. 124 The Chapter 9 process
protects taxp ayer interests in other ways as well : The creditors are not
accorded the right to demand that municip al services be cut back so as
to return the debtor to solvency; municipal officials retain some
discretion to determine the effects of additional tax on community
welfare. 1 25 This does not, at first blush, seem creditor protective. But
creditor concessions respecting the tax burden are as unavoidable in
the municipal context as they are in sovereign context . 1 26 Citizens of a
city are mobile, at least when compared to citizens of sovereign
nations. If the municipal tax b urden becomes excessive, the citizens
most able to pay the taxes will move someplace else . 127 Although a
city cannot be liquidated, an excessive tax burden imposed for the
benefit of creditors can destroy the city. 1 2 8 As a result, even though
the defaulting city conceivably could pay the creditors in full in the
long run (j ust like a defaulting sovereign) , the Chapter 9 fairness
standard contemplates that the creditors may be asked to scale back
their rights. Accordingly , the municipal "best interest of creditors"
standard does not contemplate p ayment in full. Just how much the

122. 1 1 U . S . C . § 943(b) (7) (2000) .
1 2 3 . Raffel', s upra note 7 7 , at 305 - 1 0 , w orks through the analogy in detail.
1 2 4 . 1 1 U . S . C . § 943(a) (2000) .
1 2 5 . See Michael W. McConnell & R a n d a l C . Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankrup tcy , 60 U . CHI. L . REV. 425, 466-67 ( 1 993); see also West Coast
Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist . , 1 4 4 F . 2 d 654, 678-79 (9th Cir. 1 940) (ruling plan to be
fair when providing for payments "that could re asonably be expected in all the circum stances") .
126. See supra text accompanying notes 5 2 - 5 3 .
1 2 7 . See Tarullo, supra note 9 , a t 6 3 7 - 3 8 .
12 8. Chapter 9 i s nonetheless quite protective o f the creditors' interest. The high possibility
of strategic default makes it relatively hard for a city to invoke its protection. Under 1 1 U . S . C . §
1 09(c) , a filing municipality must be insolvent, it must desire to effect a plan, and it must have
either ( 1 ) obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in a mount of the claims
of each class, (2) have attempted to negotiate with its creditors uns uccessfully, (3) be able to
show that negotiation was impracticable, or (4) reasonably believe that a creditor was attempting
to gain a preference.
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creditors may b e required t o give up i s left t o negotiation, subject to
the best interest standard and the requirement that the plan be
feasible . 1 2 9 At this point, creditor protection comes to the fore. The
best interest of creditors and feasibility standards collapse into a
unitary inquiry. As applied, the standards look to the city's ability to
pay: Its revenues and expenditures are compared, with the court
taking into account the city's taxing power and the pos sibility of tax
increases. l 3o The bondholders are paid all that could reasonably b e
expected i n the circumstances. 1 3 1
Significantly, the Chapter 9 fairness standard applies even
though a m ajority of creditors already has approved the plan after
being presented a disclosure document vetted by the court. 13 2 The
fairness test is in addition to the vote. The drafter of Chapter 9, in the
tradition of the United States law of corporate reorganization,
assumes that creditors' collective action problems make them
vulnerable to bad deals . On this scenario, insiders with private
agendas, whether agents of the defaulting municipality or agents of
financial intermediaries, can skew the deal to the creditors' detriment .
The creditors, deprived by the stay of cash flows for an extended
length of time, approve any deal that releases cash, even if an arms
length negotiator would have rejected the deal out of hand. The
fairness standard brings in a judge at the final stage to double check
the bargaining result from the creditors' point of view.
The assumptions underlying this story of cre ditor vulnerability
have come into question. Institutions have replaced individuals as the
leading bondholders . u 3 In the corporate distress context, they have
been shown to be capable of surmounting collective action problems
and saying "no" to an unsatisfactory offer from a distressed debtor. 134

129. Id. § 943(b)(7) .
1 30. See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 3 1 9 U.S. 4 1 5, 4 1 9 - 2 2 ( 1 943) .
1 3 l . See West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist . , 1 1 4 F.2d 654, 678 (9th Cir.
1 940) . For further discussion, see McConnell & Picker, supra note 125, at 464 -67.
132. See § 1 1 24.
133. Kahan, supra note 66, at 1060-62 n . 104, drawing on the last reported data on United
States corporate bond ownership (from 1995), reports that households own only 1 5 percent of
outstanding corporate bonds, while holding 41 percent of outstanding equities. He also reports
that institutional bond owners are considerably more concentrated than institutional
stockholders. Id. at 1 0 6 1 -62. The five largest holders often own 25 percent of an outstanding
issue and a majority can be made up of the largest twenty to fifty holder s . Id.
1 34 . Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose fro m Junh Bond Covenant
Changes ?, 66 J. Bus. 499, 5 1 2 (1 993); see also Lewis S. Peterson, Note , Who 's Being Greedy? A
Theoretical and Empirical Exmnination of Ho ldouts and Coercion in De b t Tender and Exchange
Offers, 103 YALE L.J. 505, 5 1 3 (1 993) (arguing that creditors, by organizing and making credible
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The same generally should be the case in the international context. 13 5
One might argue, therefore, that fairness review can be jettisoned in
the sovereign context.
But there remains an argument for retaining fairness review in
the United States b ankruptcy context. The United States
reorganization rules, under both Chapter 9 and the corporate section,
Chapter 1 1, 136 never actually require approval by a maj ority of the
cre ditors, whether simple, absolute, or super. In both Chapter 9 and
Chapter 1 1 , creditors divide themselves into multiple classes in
accordance with their priorities and other contract rights . No
particular class structure is imposed. The general creditors, for
example, could be organized in one class, or divided into a series of
classes of general creditors with particular affinities, such as trade
creditors, bondholders, short term noteholders, and subordinated
debentureholders . 1 37 When the debtor presents a plan of
reorganization, approval is done on a class-by-class basis by maj ority
vote (a vote of two-thirds of the creditors in the class by number, one
half of the total dollar amount of claims) . The plan proceeds to a j udge
for substantive review, provided that a single class has approved it by
majority vote . There is no requirement that the approving class hold
any particular minimum percentage of aggregate claims much less a
majority of claims. The result is that a plan can pass the voting stage
with the approval of only a small minority of creditors .
Gerrymandering in class formation therefore emerges a s a n imp ortant
strategic skill in bankruptcy proceedings . 13 8
Given the infirmities in the operative mode of democratic
decision making, it follows that a plan under Chapter 9 or 1 1 must
satisfy a list of substantive criteria . Under Chapter 9, the best interest
of creditors is the test. 1 39 The Chapter 1 1 criteria include a three-part
fairness test. One part of the test keys into contracted-for priorities .
commitments to rej ect tender and exchange offers can prevent firms from making. coercive
offers) .
1 3 5 . That Argentina had a large number of retail bondholders (particularly in Japan and
Germany) , however, suggests that the story about institutional holders is not universally true.
13 6. Schwarcz, supra note 78, at 9 7 1 · 1 0 1 0 , provides a more extensive treatment of Chapter
l 1 's pertinence to international bankruptcy. Our discussion has a limited purpose.
137. See 11 U . S . C . § 1 1 0 2 (b) .
1 38. The most famous examples are "new value" cases involving single purpose real estate
corporations. The debtor allied itself with a separate class of unsecured creditors owed a small
amount to attempt to cram down a plan of reorganization on dissenting secured creditor with a
claim greater than the value of the real estate asset. The definitive case rejecting the ploy is
Banh of America National Trust & Savings Ass 'n v . 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526
U.S. 434, 437, 454-58 ( 1 999) .
1 39 . 1 1 U . S . C . § 943(b) (7) (2000).
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Another part o f the test sets a minimum recovery floor. 140 The third
part of the test is a bar against unfair discrimination . 1 4 1 This holds
out the possibility that an obj ecting creditor could stop a plan
departing from the norm of pari pass u treatment of creditors of equal
priority, 1 42 with a result of horizontal equity trumping maj ority or
even supermajority rule. A plan with majority support can still be
unfair to a p articular dissenter, whether due to collusion between the
debtor and a creditor coalition or to self-interested terms inserted by a
creditor coalition acting unilaterally.
3. Implications for Sovereign Bankruptcy
This exposition of fairness review under Chapters 9 and 1 1 has
for sovereign bankruptcy.
If majority-approve d
implications
compositions are imposed on dissenting minoritie s without a fairness
check, then the voting process rises to paramount importance in the
proceeding's allocational politics. The IMF proposal reflects an
understanding of this when it suggests that all claimants be grouped
in a single class to approve the plan by a single supermajority vote . 143
This bypasses the United States practice of voting by classes .
Presumably, the number of votes per claimant will vary with the
amount of the claim. For voting purposes, other distinctions among
the creditors would be stripped away, including distinctions that loom
large in private bankruptcies, such as secured versus unsecured and
senior versus subordinated status. This should not present a problem

1 40 . The first part applies to dissenting classes. § 1 1 29(a) (8) . The second part applies to
dissenting creditors individually. Id. § 1 1 2 9 (a)(7). Ea�h part addresses the value received by the
dissenters under the plan. When a class as a whole rejects the plan, the plan fails the test if (a)
the dissenting class receives anything less than the full value of its claim and (b) any class j unior
to the dissenting class receives any proceeds under the plan. Id. § 1 1 29(b) (2) . This is the absolute
priority rule. It is applied by reference to the going concern value of the reorganizing firm: If the
firm's value exceeds the amount necessary to pay the dissenting class in full, there will be room
to allow junior creditors to get some payment on their claims.
Under the second part, dissent by an individual creditor defeats the plan if the plan provides
the creditor anything less than the amount the creditor would receive if the firm were liquidate d.
Id. § 1 1 2 9(a)(7).
1 4 l . Id. § 1 1 29 (b) ( 1 ) .
1 42 . Note that the case law does not require strict p a r i passu. treatment. See In r e Aztec C o . ,
1 0 7 B . R . 5 8 5 , 589-90 (Bankr. M . D . Tenn. 1 989) (setting out a four part test) .
143. See Krueger, supra note 78; see also I T'L M O N ETARY FUND, supra note 8 , � � 165-75.
The I M F proposal would combine the aggregate voting approach, on a three quarters majority
vote of all claims, together with a class organization structure for purposes of negotiation of the
terms of the reorganization bargain. In the authors' contemplation, a plan could treat different
classes differently so long as it garnered the requisite aggregate vote .
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in the sovereign context. Secured and subordinated lending are rare;
only official sector creditors like the IMF claim priority status . 1 44
The question, which we take up later, is whether m aterial
intercreditor conflicts of interest, washed out at the voting stage,
nevertheless could influence the terms of the composition. Note that
the IMF proposal does contemplate an adj udicatory authority that
addresses intercreditor disputes . 145
But the problems the IMF
specifies for adjudication concern only ex ante contract rights
matters like preferential payments, the prohibition of which are
fundamental to bankruptcy jurisprudence . Our question, instead, goes
to ex post relationships rather than ex ante rights . 14 6 Conflicts of
interest can arise within groups of creditors , leading to differing views
about the best interest of the group . Creditors that are nationals of the
sovereign (whether individuals or firms) may see things differently
than foreign creditors. Similarly, creditors with continuing lending
relationships with the sovereign may view plan terms differently from
creditors intending to exit . Maj ority rule addresses the problem only
by reference to the numbers . If conflicts taint only small numbers of
creditors, the plan's integrity should not be affected. But if special
interests encompass a maj ority or near maj ority, problems of
discrimination could arise. The IMF's present proposal holds out no
means to address this problem.
D. Sum mary

The IMF proposal appears to follow from deductive reasoning.
At the starting point lies the cluster of incentive problems the IMF
encountered in its 1 990s bailout s . These problems are then taken to
the corporate bankruptcy template. There the IMF planner selects
instruments that might help. The problem is that the creditors would
rather keep many of these instruments for themselves. In addition,

144. See Gelpern, supra note 1 1 1 , a t 1 1 - 1 9 (describing sovereign debt contracting practice,
including the informal nature of prioritization) . But significant distinctions remain. Different
issues of debt have different interest rates and durations, factors impacting significantly on their
market values. But these intercreditor differences are ignored in United States bankruptcy
practice.
145. Krueger, supra note 78.
1 46 . The subsequent discussion in I NT'L MON ETARY FUND, supra note 8, � � 1 5 5-64, mentions
intercreditor disputes without clearly specifying a source of authority for their determination.
Both creditors committees and the system's adjudicatory authority are mentioned. The Report is
also unclear on the question of what law would apply. See icl. � 264 (mandating application of
"relevant national law" to substantive disputes and the dispute resolution forum's "own law" for
procedural issues) .
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these grants of authority to the IMF do not themselves solve creditor
collective action problems.
What happens when the hypothesized scenario fails to play out
and the standstill imports no rapid relief? One suspects that the
process would be deployed to pressure creditors to facilitate relief by
making extraordinary give ups . In other words, there is the danger
that the IMF will use the tools of the bankruptcy scheme to effectuate
its agenda and not that of the creditors . In light of that possibility, a
rational creditor might prefer the status quo, where relief is not rapid,
but patience and an upturn in the business cycle can return the
sovereign to health. Thus rehabilitated in the fullness of time, the
sovereign returns to its creditors to make a more favorable deal. The
IMF's omission of judicial cram down becomes all the more important
on this extended distress scenario. The creditors must be left fre e to
say "no" and wait it out. 1 47
IV. T HE UNANIMOUS ACTION/COLLECTIVE ACTION PUZZLE
All sides came into the crises of the 1 990s sharing the
assumption that the shift from bank lending to bond issuance
implicated intractable coordination problems. This assumption
followed from experiences in the debt crises of the 1 980s, when
restructuring procedures were disorderly, even with long-term players
at the table and norms of cooperation in play. Hundreds of creditors
with disparate views had to be brought into line, and UAC s
complicated this task. 1 4 8 Composition was achieved only with official
sector intervention and years of negotiation. The small amount of
bonded debt was put off to one side, and allowe d to escape from
restructuring on the theory that bondholder coordination was too hard
to procure . 1 4 9 The assumption that bondholders with UACs could not
be brought to agreement on compositions benefited the bondholders in
the bailouts, as they stood to one side collecting the proceeds of
emergency loans.
These assumptions changed after 1 999 when Pakistan,
Ecuador, and Ukraine successfully concluded compositions with
147. A term the proposal omits also looms large on this scenario-the superma]onty
approval percentage. The creditors will want a number above three·quarters majority used in
British contracts; the proposal's promoters will want a number below it.
1 4 8. See Michael M. Chamberlin, Revisiting the IMF's Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposal and
the Quest for More Orderly Sovereign Work-Outs, Remarks at the Institute for International
Economics Conference "Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards" (Apr. 2, 2002),
http ://www . em tao org/ndevelop/rid 7 mac. p df.
149. See

Lipworth & Nystedt,

supra

note 3 1 , at 1 9 0 .
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dispersed bondholder particip ation. These compositions were of the
preemptive variety, 1 5 0 mooted as exchange offers, and successfully
closed before liquidity problems became serious. Vulture investors did
not disturb the proceedings . There was value on offer in the
compositions and the vultures accepted it instead of holding out for
more . 1 5 1 The success of these initiatives surprised the bond market: In
response to the closing of the Pakistan composition, borrowing costs of
other countries (countries with no significant economic connections to
Pakistan) increased by twenty-five to ninety-five basis points. 152
Now that the era of bondholder immunity from restructuring is
over, the IMF argues that bondholders need a fair and predictable
process in which to bargain over compositions. The IMF points out
that exchange offers exploit bondholder coordination problems,
skewing the field of contract in the debtor's favor. The debtor, seeking
to maximize its bargaining power, presents the compositions on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, after brief consultation with only a handful of
large bondholders . 153 For the most part, no "collaborative dialogue"
occur s . 1 54 A bankruptcy regime would offer a committee structure that
would make such negotiations feasible.
The United States Treasury rejected these arguments and took
the lead in advocating a contractual alternative (and for a time even
blocked attempts by other members of the G - 7 to issue stronger words
of support for the IMF plan) . 1 55 Like the bankruptcy proponents, the
contractarians recognize a need for concerted action within the
international financial community, but they focus on the need for a
1 50. See Punam Chuham & Federico Sturzenegger, Default Episodes in the 1 990s: What
Have We Learned? 26-27, http://www .utdt.edu/-fsturzenlchuhanfina l . p df (Nov. 24, 2003); supra
text accompanying note 5 7 .
1 5 1 . Argentina also closed a large preemptive exchange in 200 1 . This w a s a voluntary
operation, eschewing the coercive device of the exit consent. Approximately one third of
Argentina's debt was exchanged, amounting to one half of eligible bonds. Ninety percent of
Argentina's retail European investors exchanged. ADAM LERRICK & ALLAN H. M ELTZER,
CARNEGIE M ELLON GAlLLIOT CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, SOVEREIGN DEFAULT: THE PRIVATE SECTOR
CAN
RESOLVE
BANKRUPTCY
WITHOUT
A
FORMAL
COURT
4
(Apr.
2002),
http://www .e mcreditors .com/pdf/n_JEC%20Sov%20Bankruptcy%20Study%20. pdf
1 5 2 . Matthew R. McBrady & Mark S. Seasholes, Bailing-In 4 (Dec. 20, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) .
1 5 3. INT L MONETARY FUND, INVOLVING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE RESOLUTION OF
FINANCIAL CRIS ES-RESTRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN BONDS 1 4 - 1 6 (200 1 ) .
'

1 5 4 . See Krueger, supra note 78.
15 5. See Taylor, supra note 1 1 . Although Taylor's position in April 2002 appeared to be an
outright rejection of the IMF's statutory propos al, the Treasury's stance appears to have softened
to one of considering both proposals (while still favoring the contractual approach) . See Michael
M. Phillips, Sllpp ort Builds for Plan to Ease Debt Loads of Deve loping Nations, WALL ST. J . ,
Sept. 1 7 , 2002, a t A 1 6 .
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transition from UACs to CACs . As we have seen, UACs make it hard
to garner creditor assent to a composition. Bankruptcy proponents
argue that this strengthens the case for mandatory intervention.
Contractarians reverse this argument, drawing on two assumptions :
First, compositions in theory create value; and second, UAC s in theory
benefit only opportunists who hold up rational creditors who seek
access to the value created. Given both assumptions, the bondholders
should be willing to exchange their UAC bonds for CAC bonds. All one
need do is make a public offer of the new CAC bonds and let the
market price them.l5 6 The price will, in any event, exceed that of the
VAC bonds, inducing across-the-board exchanges by the old
bondholders, 157 even the vultures . I5S
Experts are drafting new model provisions for sovereign debt
contracts. These include : I 59

15 6 . Presumably, the stronger the I M F policy against bailouts, the lower the price.
1 5 7. See Lerrick & Meltzer, supra note 1 5 1 , at 3-4.
1 5 8. Any additional value -creating features of the proposed sovereign b a nkruptcy regime can
be included in the new bond contracts. For example, if a standstill declared by the IMF creates
value, the new bond contracts can channel enforcement through an i ndenture trustee whose
enforcement powers yield to the standstill. Taylor, supra note 1 1 . If subordination to new loans
made after a default makes the bondholders better off, the pari passu clauses in the bonds can
open up an exception. See Lerrick & Meltzer, supra note 1 5 1 , at 3-4. If creditors need to delegate
bargaining authority to representatives, that too can be done in advance in the contracts. See
Taylor, supra note 1 1 , � 1 3 .
There i s a rich literature advocating contractually authorized bankruptcy. See, e.g. , Alan
Schwartz, A Contract Theory App roach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1 807, 1820-39
( 1 998); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Nlenu Approach to Corporate Banh ruptcy, 71
T E X . L . R E V . 51, 100 -2 1 (1 992).
1 5 9. See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 90. See also Miller, supra note 1, at 183-97, for an
overview. See also G 7 F I N . MINIST E RS & C E N T . BANK GOVERNORS, DECLARATION � � 4-9 (1 998)
(examining
and
suggesting reforms
to
the
international
financial
system) ,
at
http ://www .imf.org/external/np/g7/ 10 3098dc . htm;
G-7 FIN. MINISTERS & C ENT. BANK
-

GOVERNORS, STRENGTHENING THE INTE RNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE MULTILATERAL

� � 1 1 - 1 3 (200 1 ) , at http ://www.g8. utoronto.ca/finance/ fmO l 070 7 . htm;
� � 4-10 ( 1 996) (considering
means to deal with future sovereign liquidity crises), available at http ://www .bis.org/
publ/gten0 3 . htm; INT'L M O NETARY & FIN. COM M . , BD. OF GOVERNORS, IMF, COMMUNIQUE � 1 1
(200 1) (looking forward to exploration of increased private sector involvement in crisis
prevention and management) , at http://www.imf. org/external/ np/cm/200 1l0 10429b.htm; see also,
e.g. , BA R RY E I C HENGR E E N , TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARC HITECTURE: A
PRACTICAL P O ST-ASIA AGENDA 9- 1 8 ( 1 999) (offe ring "pragmatic" proposals for reform) ; BARR Y
EICHE N GREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORD ERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN
DEBTORS 28-54 ( 1 995) (discussing options and offering an agenda for reform) ; Lee C. Buchheit, A
Lawyer's Perspective on the New Financial Architecture, 14 J . INT'L BANIGNG L. 225 (1 999) ,
reprinted in TH E REFORM O F THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ARCHITECTURE 235 (Rosa M. Lastra
ed. , 200 1 ) ; Lee C. Buchheit, The Collectiue Represe ntation Clause, INT'L F I N . L. REV . , Sept. 19 98,
at 9 , 9- 1 1 (considering possible changes to bond docu mentation) ; Lee C . Buchheit, Majority
Action Clauses May Help Reso lve De bt Crises, INT'L FIN . L. REV . , July 1 9 98, at 13, 1 3 - 14; Lee C.
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( 1) Provisions aggregating all the issuer's bonds into one class
for purposes of approving a composition. The CACs would p ermit the
modification of payment terms by a majority fraction of the bonds that
is significantly less than the current 1 0 0 p ercent requirement.
(2) Clauses restricting individual bondholder enforcement
power. These e nforcement constraints could include :
(i) Maj ority action enforcement clauses . Thes e require
p ermission from a significant fraction of the bondholders before
an individual bondholder can bring suit. This clause, taken
together with a CAC respecting contract amendment, makes
restructuring easier by relaxing the unanimity requirement
and makes it harder for maverick creditors, in search of
preferential p ayment s , to bring disruptive litigation.
(ii) Super Trustee provisions . Trustees under current
New Yor k -issued sovereign bond contracts perform largely
ministerial tasks . 160 Super Trustee provisions would grant the
trustees significantly more authority . The Super Trustee would
be able to make substantive decisions for the bondholders on
matters such as whether to bring suit for unpaid amounts and
whether to accept a restructuring offer. A Super Trustee would
act for the benefit of the creditor class as a whole, solving
collective action problems while eliminating the problem of
maverick litigation.
(iii) Sharing clauses. A sharing clause obliges any
bondholder who sues to share the recovery ratably with the
other bondholders. 161 As a practical matter, the sharing clause
removes the incentive for individual bondholders to sue
unilaterally in the hope of receiving an e arlier and larger
payment than that received by other members of the group .
Designing new clauses is easy. The hard part is getting the
debtors and creditors to accept them. 1 6 2 The parties are far apart:

Buchheit, Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1 998, at
1 7 , 1 7 - 1 9 (exploring the use of contractual provisions in sovereign bonds).
160. This is a far cry from the world of common stock, where shareholders of large public
companies delegate almost all authority for important decisions to the Board of Directors.
1 6 l . Under the interpretation of the pari passu clause in Elliott v. Peru, Elliott Assocs . , L . P . ,
General Docket N o . 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals o f Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept . 2 6 , 2000), this
is what the pari passu clause would operate to do. That particular interpretation, however, has
come under some challenge . See supra note 109.
162 . Krueger, for the IMF, responds that the UAC - CAC swap will not work . Krueger, supra
note 78. The same creditor coordination problems that necessitate a mandatory bankruptcy will
get in the swap's way. Id. Opportunistic b o ndholders will hold out, with the result that
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While those on the drafting project talk about a two-thirds or three
quarters maj ority rule , the Emerging Market Creditors Association
suggest something between 90 and 95 percent as an appropriate
majority rule. 1 63 Many sovereign debtors match the creditors in their
lack of enthusiasm for the contractual initiative. Presumably, they
fear that CACs could raise borrowing costs and retard the flow of
credit. But the m arket has begun taking baby steps towards CACs
despite these fears . We have seen offerings in New York using both a
75 percent and an 8 5 percent threshold. Although the 7 5 percent
threshold appears to be winning, it is still too early to predict where
the market will settle , or whether it will settle on CACs at al1. 1 64
A full scale and rapid transition to CAC bonds in new
financings seems likely only if the IMF credibly conditions the
availability of credit on use of the new debt contract provisions . 1 65 But
even if such a stick proved effective, it would take years before a full
transition to CACs could take place . At the end of 200 1 , $ 3 5 4 billion of
sovereign debt was outstanding. Of this amount, 70 percent was
issued in the United States and Germany under UACs, while most of
the remaining 30 percent was issued in Britain and Luxembourg
under CACS. 1 66 If all bonds issued from 2002 onward contain CACs
but none of the existing UACs are amended, 80 percent of bonds would
be governed by CACs by 2 0 1 0 and 90 percent by 2 0 1 9 . 167
A near term contractual solution to the creditor coordination
problem, however, calls for a more heroic effort: All (or nearly all)
outstanding UAC bonds would have to be exchanged for CAC bonds . If
the contractual approach's basic assumption-that CACs create value
significant numbers of UAC bonds will remain in circulation. ld. Nor, absent a mandate, c a n
there be any guarantee that CACs will be universal i n future bond issues . ld. Finally, absent a
neutral supervising authority, there will b e no guarantee of a clean vote. ld.
1 6 3 . See Michael M. Chamberlin, Executive Director EMTA, Sovereign Debt Contracts: What
Do We Need to Change 3 (2002) (reporting on the view of the six emerging market debt trade
associations) , http ://www . e mta. org/keyper/iifl O I 7 . pdf.
16 4 . See Barham, supra note 93, at 1 3 (asking whether Argentina will choose the 75 percent
from Mexico and Uruguay or 85 percent from Brazil) ; Felix Salmon, Brazil Goes Off on a CACs
Tangent, E UROMO NEY, June 2003, at 1 5 6, 1 56.
165. For a discussion of the difficulties which might arise in connection with this , see INT'L
MON ETARY

FUND ,

COLLECTIVE

ACTION

CLAUSES

IN

SOVEREIGN

BOND

C O NTRACTS

1 3 , 1 5 , 16-20 (2002) .
Taylor suggests that the IMF could offer an interest rate reduction for sovereign borrowers
whose private sector bonds contain CACs. See Taylor, supra note 1 l . Taylor also mentions a
stick-the IMF would require any country using a credit facility to use CACs in its bonds. ld.
The previous administration also took a position against interference with contract rights, even
as it admitted that the contracts might be costly and inefficient. Tarullo, sup ra note 9, at 6 7 l .
166. INT'L MON ETARY FUND, supra note 1 6 5, at 5 tbLI.
ENCOURAGING GREATER USE

167. lei. at 6.
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by solving creditor coordination problems-is correct, then both
debtors and creditors should be clamoring for these CAC exchange s.
But there has been no such demand. So it appears that a c arrot will be
needed in the form of additional consideration. Alternatively, a stick
could be wielded through the exit consent device, but these devices are
disliked in the creditor community. 168 Plus, some exchanges will be
hard to effectuate, even with exit consents, because the issuers are
already in trouble. 16 9 If CACs do create value, why this resistance?
The discussion that follows shows that the CAC value story is
contestable. In the imperfect world we live in, a rational bondholder
may prefer the VAC .
A. Empirical Studies

A number of empirical studies seek to sustain (or falsify) the
claim that CACs create value. If the CAC value story is accurate, CAC
bonds should sell at lower yields than UAC bonds. But setting up a
pair of comparison bonds is difficult . Ide ally, one would want thickly
traded bonds from the same issuer, with identical contract terms
(other than, of course, the amendment clauses) . 1 70 No such bonds
exist; therefore, the studie s proceed on a rougher basis.
One set of studies finds that CACs reduce borrowing costs for
the most creditworthy issuers, and increase them for less creditworthy
issuers. The inference is that good credits benefit from the prospect of
coordination and lower default costs, while bad credits do not benefit
because the cost advantages of the CAC are outweighe d by moral
hazard and default risk. l71 Other studies find no evidence that CACs
affect borrowing costS. 1 72 Here, the inference is that the cost benefits
of easy restructuring are cancelled out by the attendant decrease In
the costs of default and aggravation of the moral hazard problem.
168. ld. at 19.
1 6 9. ld.
1 70. ld.
1 7 1 . Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka M od y, Is Aggrega tio n a Problem for Sovereign De b t
Restru cturing?, 9 3 AM . E C O N . REV. 8 0 (2003) (PAPERS & PRO C EEDINGS); see also Barry
Eichengreen et aI. , Crisis Resolution: Next Steps, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON E C O N . ACTIVITY
(forthcoming 2003) (reporting on recent empirical research on the topic) , http://p apers .n ber.org/
papers/w 10095. pdf.
1 7 2. See TORBJORN BEC KER ET AL . , BOND RESTR UCTURING AND MORAL HAZARD : ARE
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES C O S TLY ? 25-26 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 0 1/92,
200 1); see also Anthony Richards, The Usage and Pricing of Collective Action Clauses in
In ternational Bond Issues (May 26, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) . Still
more studies find that CAC issuers pay a small premiu m . Contrariwise, some report a small
discount for UK issuance. I NT L M O N ETARY FUN D , supra note 1 6 5 , at 1 2 .
'
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We question whether any study in the present context can yield
a measure of the relative value of CACs and UAC s . Even if a pair of
comparison bonds existed and the market p erceived an advantage in
holding the CAC bond, it is not clear that bond prices would reflect the
market's p erception. Hypothesize an issuer having CAC bonds and
UAC bonds outstanding simultaneously. If the issuer goes into
distress, a bondholder coordination problem arises respecting the UAC
bonds. If the UAC bondholders cannot be induced to agree to a
composition, then any composition tentatively reached with the CAC
bondholders presumably fails as well. The final effectiveness of the
CAC issue composition (if properly drafted) would be conditioned on
the closing of the compositions of all other issues of bonds . Otherwise,
the CAC issue would end up surrendering value while the UAC issue
withheld consent, causing a transfer of value from the CAC issue to
the UAC issue .
Extending this line of analysis, hypothesize an issuer having
only CAC bonds outstanding. Would that country's debt have a lower
coupon than debt of the same maturity of another country of equal
creditworthiness whose bonds contained UACs? We doubt it. Nothing
would guarantee that, in the event of distress at some future time , all
of the first country's issues still would be governed by CACs . This is
because nothing prevents a CAC borrower from ne gotiating a new
debt issue in New York using UACs, or, alternatively, from refunding
an existing CAC borrowing in New York under a UAC . The low coupon
CAC borrower, thus, could at any time turn itself into a borrower with
a potential creditor coordination proble m . 1 73 Given this inherent
flexibility of status, it is difficult to see how a market yield comparison
could demonstrate the value differential between CACs and UACs. 17 4
The result is that the value creation story remains a theoretical
assertion. If the assertion is correct, however, we must account for the
market resistance to CACs by reference to frictions, behavioral biase s ,

1 7 3 . The problem could b e solved in the CACs themselves. The CACs would condition the
availability of majority amendment on majority amendment's availability in all of the issuer's
bonds. We are unaware of any real world use of such a provision.
1 74 . Compare the study of the effect of projected restructuring costs due to aggregation
problems-that is, coordination costs stemming from a large number of bond issues outstanding,
each one of which separately would have to assent in a restructuring. By hypothesis, t.he larger
the number of bond issues outstanding, the greater the potential cost. Barry Eichengreen and
Ashoka Mody show that distributing the same principal amount of debt across diflerent bond
issues raises the cost of debt on the tenth issue by about 8 basis points. Eichengreen & Mody,
supra note 1 7 1 . The impact is greater when the issuer has a low credit rating. Interestingly, they
find that the presence or absence of CACs does not significantly effect the perceived costs of
aggregation. Id.
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path dependencies, and other imperfections. Alternatively, we can
question the value assertion itself. Perhaps CACs do not hold out a
first best e quilibrium solution for sovereign debt contracting. If CACs
are not first best, then a rational creditor in a second best world might
choose a UAC .
B. Frictions and Imperfectio ns

1 . Ignorance and Myopia
The first wave of articles and reports on CAC s , produced in the
mid and late 1 990s, had an explanatory tone. The writers assumed
that sovereign debtors and creditors needed to learn about the clauses'
benefits. Once the market heard the word, it would pick up the value
on the table. 1 75 Yet, after a plethora of articles, numerous conferences,
and repeated official sector pronouncements, most new bond issues
done prior to 2003 still contained UACs. Given the bombardment of
material since the mid- 1 990s, no one can argue that the reason this
move did not begin prior to 2003 was that no one knew about the
CACs .
Continued attachment to UACs suggests myopia on the p arties'
part, particularly amongst creditors . If creditors have a strong, albeit
irrational, preference for UACs , borrowers will cater to this preference
in order to avoid an increase in borrowing costs . This leaves open the
problem of explaining the creditors' irrational preference.
2. Drafting Inertia
Some research suggests that contracting parties are biased in
favor of using established, standard terms in their contracts. This is
referred to as the "status quo" bias . 1 7 6 Perhaps we have such a
pattern of bias here, especially considering that the respective drafting

175. For example, take the articles by Lee Buchheit. See supra note 1 59 . One sees a similar
tone in the early official sector reports exhorting the use of CACs, such as the 1996 Rey Report
that recommended the adoption of CACs as a measure to facilitate debt restructuring. GROUP OF
TEN, supra note 159. For a chronology of events, see Press Release, Dep't of Fin . , C anada,
Reforming the Global Financial Architecture: A Chronology, available at http://www.fin.gc.ca/
news02/02-034e.html#Reforming.
1 76. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Ru les, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (arguing that parties to a contract view default terms as the status
quo and that parties prefer the status quo to other alternatives) .
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practices of New York and London can be traced back to Victorian
times . l 7 7
A status quo bias is not an immovable block, however. It is only
a bia s . Even as p eople attach themselves to the contract terms that
they begin with or inherit, they still should be willing to switch in
order to capture significant benefits . The benefits claimed for CACs
seem significant enough to have induced a switch by now, if those
benefits actually exist.
3 . Moral Hazard
Under the moral hazard story, creditors and defaulting
sovereigns both want bailouts. l78 If their contracts have CACs, the
official sector-the rich countries and the international financial
institutions they control-will order the debtors to work out any
problems with their creditors . UAC s, in contrast, let the distressed
debtors and creditors point to an insurmountable barrier to
restructuring. The official sector then has no option but to provide a
subsidy. The preference for UACs thus follows from opportunism.
But this story is incomplete . First, it only accounts for the
preference for UACs beginning in the mid- 1 990s. It does not explain
why UACs proliferated in the first place or why lenders in the private
sector often prefer the m. 1 79 Second, not every distressed sovereign
gets bailed out, as the world saw with Argentina. It follows that a
bond issued by a country with a low likelihood of getting a bailout
could be more valuable with a CAC. But we see no such pattern.
Third, b ailouts are not fre e . They come with conditions that further
the political interests of the IMF and its primary sponsors . 180 There
1 7 7 . De Forest Billyou, Corporate Mo rtgage Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L.J. 595,
595-96 (1 948). The "innovation externalities" identified by Kahan , supra note 66, at 1079, in
respect of the improvement of corporate trust indentures, do not obtain in respect of CACs and
UACs. An innovation externality deters contractual improvement because, absent patent
protection, the improvement is shared among the entire class of users. The sharing denudes the
innovating lawyers of an incentive to invest in improvements. Id. Here, in contrast, the
competing contract forms already are on the table. For the same reason, we see no network
externality deterrent here. Standard forms are available if the market wants to shift to CACs.
1 78. See supra text accompanying note 1 4 .
17 9. See infra note 184.
180. For example, it is rumored that recent disbursements of funds to Pakistan and Turkey
were impliedly conditioned on supporting the anti-terrorism coalition and clamping down on
Islamic militants within their borders. Brazil provides a more explicit recent case . At the time of
its bailout, a pending election both contributed to the distress and gave rise to policy concerns in
the official sector. Leftist candidates who were leading in the polls were required to make public
guarantees that they would continue to support the current government's free market economic
policies-a step at least partially inconsistent with their political p latforms. Further, it is
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may be some countries that are simply too big or too nuclear to be
allowed to fail. For the rest, it is not clear that strategic contracting
makes sense .
4. Signaling
Asymmetric information can explain the failure to adopt CACs.
The story is that creditors do not have full information about debtors,
and thus worry about unob servable downside factors . When a debtor
asks for a CAC, the creditor infers that the debtor expects to default.
No debtor wants to signal itself as being at a high risk of defaulting;
therefore, no debtor asks for CACs .
O f course, if CACs create value in excess of the cost to the
debtor of the negative signal, then we should expect the debtors to
introduce them despite the signal . A first mover problem m ay explain
why this does not happen. Given inertia in the market, the first
issuers to change their contracts disrupt market expectations and, as
a result, incur special costs . Those costs would be compounded in the
case of a change from VACs to CACs because the benefits stemming
from the clauses accrue on a very long term . 1 S1 It follows that the
costs may outweigh the benefits for the first mover, even though the
benefits far outweigh the costs for debtors as a whole .
There are three problems, however, with this explanation.
First, it looks only at the debtor's stake in the contract's ame ndment
terms. Thus, even if the explanation is correct, we still have to explain
why the creditors do not request CACs. Second, the story fails to
confront historic market practice . An issuer seeking a CAC always has
the option of taking its loan transaction to London. In so doing it runs
little chance of sending a negative signal respecting creditworthine ss,
as New York does not take the good credits and London the bad.
Countries finance in London for a long list of reasons, like interest
r ates, transaction costs, customers , and relationships with
intermediaries; all factors more important at closing than the choice of
a CAC over a VAC . Third, recent market developments rebut the
story. The first moves have taken place (we suspect with pressure
difficult for many countries to know, ex ante, whether they will qualify for a bailout in the event
of a future economic crisis. A couple of years ago, Pakistan was grouped with Ecuador and
Ukraine as a country unlikely to receive a bailout. The geopolitical shifts of 200 1 brought it to
the front of the queue .
1 8 1 . I NT'L MONETARY FUND , supra note 1 65, at 1 1 . For a fuller discussion of frictions that
inhibit the improvement of standard form contracts, see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Path Dependence in Corporate Co ntracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behauior and Cognitiue
Biases, 74 WASH. U. L . Q . 347, 353 -65 ( 1 996) .
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from the Treasury) , but t o our knowledge there have been no
subs equent exchange offers to move from UACs to CACs.
5. Path Dependence
The practice divergence between New York and London can be
explained in part by legislative intervention and legal precedent. In
the United States, Section 3 1 6(a) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1 93 9
requires that contracts governing publicly issued bonds contain
Contrariwise, it has been suggested that the Unite d
UACS. 1 82
Kingdom requires inclusion of CACs in bonds under its law . 1 8 3
Neither regulation extends to sovereign bonds, but such regulations
could have "locked in" the drafting practice in the two financial
centers. Departure from the forms disrupts expectations and cause s
costs to be incurred. Other things being equal, could not the
intermediaries be sticking mindlessly to the inherited forms, which
have been influenced by regulation ?
The problem is that other things are not equal under the CAC
superiority story. Given value on the table, New York underwriters
would request redrafting of the standard forms, and the lawyers
would do what they were told despite their practice traditions and any
associated cognitive biases. 18 4
1 82 . Trust Indenture Act of 1 939 § 3 1 6(a), 1 5 U . S . C . § 7 7ppp (2000) . The purpose of the
section was to discourage out-of-court compositions so as to force the parties into the then new
Chapter X b ankruptcy procedure , where strong judicial supervision was provided for. Roe, supra
note 6, at 234. Roe argues, correctly, that subsequent changes in bankruptcy law and practice
remove the need for the mandate. Id. at 3 1 6 . Our point is that removal of the mandate would
bring no change in the actual provisions of bonds, which would continue to include UA C s .
1 83 . INT'L MONETARY FUND, REPORT O F T H E ACTING MANAGING DIRECTOR T O THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL C O MMITTEE ON PROGRESS IN REFORMING THE IMF
AND STRENGTHENING THE ARCHITECTURE OF T H E INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM � 54 (Apr.

1 2 , 2000), http://www.imf. org/external/np/omdJ2 000/report.htm . cited in Tarullo. supra note 9. at
6 7 1 n. 1 9 6 .
1 84. Plus, the continuing presence i n United States l a w of a UAC mandate respecting
publicly traded bonds does not dictate a UAC practice respecting many bonds and notes issued
outside of the mandate's parameters. These include privately placed notes, notes traded on the
so-called 1 4 4A market, b ank term loans, and sovereign bonds. Yet, despite the absence of
regulations mandating the terms of any of these debt contracts, almost all use UACs in the
United States. Howard J. Kashner, Majority Clauses and No n-banhruptcy Corporate
Reorganizations-Contractual and Statutory Alternatives, 44 Bus. LAW. 123, 1 2 4-25 (1 988) . The
UAC practice, by the way, also shows up with respect to b ank term loans in the U nited
Kingdom-that country's dominant mode of debt finance. J O H N ARMOUR & SIMON DEAKIN,
NORMS IN PRIVATE INSOLVENCY: THE "LO NDON ApPROACH" TO THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL
DISTRESS (Univ. of Pa. L. Sch . , Inst. of L. & Econ . , Working Paper No. 1 7 3, 200 1 ) .

CAC bonds appeared i n American financial history i n cognizable numbers i n only one era.
This was during the Depression, whe n new b onds issued in reorganizations of insolvent single
purpose real estate corporations sometimes contained CACs. According to testi mony by an SEC
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6 . Summary

The foregoing explanations, taken separately or as a group , fail
to explain why CACs have failed to proliferate (assuming that the
value story has merit) . But they do suggest that frictions will retard
the present contractual reform initiative . They also leave us with a
question: Whether lenders for more than a century have been
investing billions of dollars pursuant to manifestly irrational
contracts?
C. The Pers istent Preference for Unani mous Action

vVhy, despite the logic of maj ority action, do American lenders
retain their preference for unanimity not only in sovereign bonds but
in all types of lending? We have three suggestions . The first follows
from enforcement theory: UACs deter default by making it more
expensive. Our second suggestion follows from reputational theory:
vVhen a rehabilitating debtor makes a composition offer, the process
context influences the division of the surplus ; UACs force the debtor to
make a higher offer. The third suggestion looks to intercreditor
conflicts . Coalitions within the creditor group or amongst creditors
and the debtor can use the maj ority action privilege to impose unequal
outcomes. The rational creditor will require a defense against such
exploitation. Absent a robust backstop of intercreditor good faith
duties, only a right of individual dissent suffices.
1. The Cost of Default
The value of a CAC lies in cheaper creditor coordination and
enhanced chances of composition. But there are cost s . Whether by
reducing out of pocket costs or by making compositions more
acce ssible , CACs make default cheaper. To. the extent default is
cheaper, strategic default becomes a more viable alterative.
staffer at the H earings o n the Trust Indenture Act, CAC bonds constituted about 1 0 percent of
the market. Hearings on H.R. 5220, 76th Congo 284-85 ( 1 9 39) . Much like dealmakers at today's
IMF, the dealmakers in those reorganizations operated in a world without a bankruptcy
procedure that imposed majority rule (at least prior to 1 9 3 4) . Also, like actors at the IMF, they
had become exasperated with coordination problems stemming from UACs. Bi lly ou , supra note
1 7 7 , at 595-96. Unfortunately for the CAC value story, however, those actors also were fa mously
sleazy. The real estate bond firms, precursors of the j unk bonds dealers of the 1 9 70s and 19 80s,
had been hawking speculative paper to credulous retail investors for decades, promising high
returns for no risk . See JAlvIES GRANT, M ONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LEN DING I N
AMERICA fROM THE C IV I L WAR TO M ICHAEL MILKEN 1 5 7 - 7 2 ( 1 9 92) (providing a histOl'Y of early
twentieth century real estate finance).

SOVEREIGN DEB T REFORM

2004]

55

But d o sovereign lenders really incur a cognizable risk of
strategic default? A default makes sense for a sovereign if the savings
from the composition exceed the costs of default. If we as sume a debt
structure with CAC s, that result follows only if the debtor persuades a
majority of creditors to vote for the restructuring. We think it likely
that institutional lenders will vote against such a restructuring if they
think that the country is acting opportunistically. If we proj ect
correctly, the advantage of UACs over CACs with respect to strategic
default deterrence is negligible. UACs would have a more cognizable
advantage if information asymmetries can prevent big lenders from
distinguishing between a strategic and a distress default. But, if there
were a real risk of that happening, one would have expected creditors
to be more enthusiastic about the IMF bankruptcy proposal. The IMF
makes itself the gatekeeper in the proposal, undertaking to analyze a
country's true financial condition b efore commencement of a
composition process. Now, even though the creditors had many
reasons for opposing the IMF's proposal, with lack of trust in the IMF
no doubt prime among the m , we suspect that they saw no
countervailing benefit in IMF gatekeeping. Our guess is that the
creditors believe themselves and other market actors, such as credit
rating agencies and investment banks, to be quite capable of
distinguishing between strategic and distres s defaults.
A complication remains. We also h ave seen that sovereign
defaults have strategic overtones even in distress situations :
Sometimes government actors decide to default, making a political
decision that weighs the impact of tax hikes and other strains on the
domestic economy against the cost of default . 1 8 5 If CACs influence
these calculations so as to make default m ore likely, then it follows
that the contractual initiative does not hold out a free lunch, at least
to a private creditor.
Nobody knows where these costs and benefits net out . Recall
the ambiguous implications of the empirica l studies canvassed in the
previous section. One study, finding no e vidence that CACs lower
borrowing costs , l SG reasonably inferred that the decrease in the cost of
default and the attendant increase in the magnitude of the moral
hazard problem caused by CACs could offset the benefits of easy
restructuring. On this analysis, a creditor rationally could choose
between a CAC and a UAC b ased on a coin flip . From this , an
explanation for the century-long divergence in the drafting traditions

1 8 5 . See supra text accompanying note 5 l .
18 6. See

sup rct

note 1 72 and accompanying text.
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of New York and London follows . As between the two app arently e qual
choices, any small factor in the legal, economic, or cultural b ackground
can cause the practice to tip in favor of one approach over the other .
The choice having been made, the conservative , repetitive dynamic of
debt contracting assures that the choice becomes universal in the
market and prevails for an indefinite period.
Recall that a contrasting study suggested that creditworthy
borrowers might prefer CACs because cheaper creditor coordination
would lower the creditors' default costs . Borrowers with bad credit
would use UACs because, with default a more immediate prospect, the
cost advantages of the CAC would be outweighed in the lenders' minds
by moral hazard and default risk. 187 But this theory can support the
opposite conclusion as well. 188 Bolton and Scharfstein hypothesize
that a low- quality firm would find it optimal to maximize its
liquidation value : A distress default being likely, it would want
contracts carrying as little cost as possible in the event of default. The
s maller the number of creditors and the lower the voting barrier, the
cheaper the liquidation and the greater the value of the debt. 1 8 9 In
contrast, with high credit borrowers, strategic default is the dominant
problem. Factors increasing the cost of such a default-such as
multiple creditors and tougher voting rules-enhance the value of the
debt. 190
We emerge with opposing sugge stions: CACs for good credits
and UACs for bad credits, or alternatively, UACs for good credits and
CACs for bad credits . This ambiguous economics fails to predict a
logical dominance by either UACs or CACS . 191
2 . The Division of the Surplus
Bolton and Scharfstein explain that the greater the number of
creditors and the higher the percentage of creditor votes needed to
approve a renegotiation, the lower the debtor firm's surplus in the
renegotiation . 19 2 This point says something important about United
States creditors' preference for UACs.
187. See supra note 1 7 1 and accompanying text.
1 88. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Op timal Deb t Structure and the Nu m ber of
Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECO N . 1 , 1 9-20 ( 1 996) .
189. Id . at 3.
190. Id.
1 9 l . Patrick Bolton notes an additional complicating factor. Bolton, supra note 7 6 . A
borrower's commitment to excessively high restructuring costs does more than b uild in a
disincentive to default. Id . at 3 l . It also builds in an incentive to overborrow. Id. at 3 1 -32.
192. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 1 88, at 1 8 .
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Consider the game posited below:
Exchange Offe r Game

Creditor B
Cooperate
Creditor A

The

set

D e fect

Cooperate

625, 625

550, 800

D efe ct

800, 5 5 0

4 0 0 , 400

up

assumes

that

a

sovere i gn

borrower

in

distress h a s offered i t s two creditors a comp os ition of $ 5 5 0 .
T h e offer i s stingy: I f the creditors surmount their collective
acti on problem and negotiate w ith the b orrower, they can get
the offer i ncreased to $625. Holding o ut, "defecting" in the
p arlance of the p r i s o ne r's dilemma, can mean an $800 p ayoff.
If both creditors h old out, the deal fails and the recovery i s

$400 received aft e r a n extended default and a long lapse of
time .

It is unclear what a creditor should do. The italicized outcomes
in the chart show A's optimal moves given the alternatives of
cooperation and defection by B. If B accepts the offer, A is better off
holding out and taking the $800. But if B holds out, A is better off
cooperating and taking the $5 50, thereby avoiding the worst-case
payoff of $400. Since A does not know what B is going to do, it is not
clear how A should play. A multiple equilibrium outcome results-the
situation is unstable.
The posited payoffs lend insight into the divergence of views
between the official sector and the creditors. Bankruptcy proponents
focus on the avoidance of the $ 400 pc.yoff and the realization of the
$625 payoff, arguing that only a bankruptcy process offers the
cre ditors a stable context in which to realize the $62 5 . The
contractarians also focus on the avoidance of the $400, positing that
with CACs and a large group of creditors , the prospect of an $800
recovery is eliminated, and with it the $400 worst-case scenario. The
question is how the dispersed creditors then surmount the negotiating
barrier presented by the take-it-or-leave-it exchange offer of $5 50, so
as to benefit from a more equal division of the surplus. The magnitude
of the resulting problem depends on the barrier's height . Given
institutional bond holding, the barrier may not present a substantial
problem in the real world. Informal coordination is possible amongst a
small group of lead institutions , making it possible for the group to
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rej ect $ 5 5 0 and b argain for $625 as a group without the need for a
bankruptcy process.
The UAC proponent sees things differently. If all the bonds
have CACs , the take-it-or-leave-it offer is $550. The question i s
whether the offer would b e higher if all the bonds h a d UACs . We
answer the question in the affirmative, and suspect that most
creditors do too. Given information asymmetries , the creditors will
have a range of upset prices respecting acceptance of the debtor's offer.
If the debtor needs 100 percent or a supermaj ority, it will have to
increase its offer to meet the reservation prices at the higher end of
the range . 1 93 The UAC thus counteracts the disorganized creditors'
tendency to cut and run to take a lowball offer.
Of course the UAC creates a hold out problem even as it causes
the offer to rise. But a hard-nosed bondholder has a respons e : If the
offer makes a generous split of the surplus, holdouts will not be so
numerous as to threaten the deal. No one ever expects 1 00 percent
participation in a composition under UAC s . Yet such exchange offers
close all the time on the basis of supermaj ority acceptance. 1 94
Meanwhile, neither the bankruptcy advocates nor the contractarians
offer evidence that holdouts regularly cause exchange offers to fail. 195
When offers do fail, it may be that they are too low and, as a result,
attract something much less than a supermaj ority of creditors . 1 9 6

1 93 . This is nothing more than the law of downward sloping demand. It explains why
bidders make tender offers for majority blocks with back end mergers, rather than attempt to
purchase firms through open market purchases. See generally Richard Booth, Discounts and
Other V
l lysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1 0 55 ( 1 99 1 ) (arguing that the existence of
downward sloping demand explains various market phenomena) ; Lynn Stout, Are Taheover
Premiums Really Premiums? Marhet Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1 235,
1259-75 ( 1 990) .
194. The creditor associations are asserting that a 90 percent participation would be
needed-a daunting figure. See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 90. But a look at the leading private
case, Katz v. Oah Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1 986), shows a complex exchange offer
with an upset participation requirement of 85 percent or less. That upset calculation will change
from situation to situation.
195. See Stewart Gilson, Transac tions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence fro m
Financially Distressed Firms, 5 2 J . FIN. 1 6 1 , 169-70 ( 1 997) (showing that the holdout problem
does not seem to be so severe as to prevent the accomplishment of restructurings respecting
public debt, particularly given use of coercive devices like exit consents); see also Jean Helwege,
How Long Do Junh Bonds Spend in Default?, 54 J. FIN. 3 4 1 , 348-49 ( 19 99) .
1 96. We draw indirect support for this assertion from Marcel Kahan and Bruce Tuckman, Do
Bondholders Lose from Junh Bond Covenant Changes ? 66 J. Bus. 499 ( 1 993) . This presents the
results of a study of 58 consent solicitations in which an issuer of widely held debt requested the
mo dification of existing covenants but did not request either interest deferral or principal
forgiveness. Id. at 502-03. Since covenants tend to be ab sent from investment grade debt, nearly
all of the issues surveyed were junk bonds. Id. at 503. The solicitations broke down as follows: 25
were simple consent solicitations in which receipt of an offered cash payment was conditioned on
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A numerical example will help explain this. Assume that a
sovereign is in default on debt with a face amount of $ 1 00 . These
bonds are trading for $ 6 5 , a value that can be expected to fall further
unless rehabilitation succeeds by means of a composition. The
sovereign, now on the road to recovery, can afford to pay $95. The
surplus is $95 minus $ 6 5 or $30. Assume that with a CAC providing
for amendment by a two-thirds maj ority, the sovereign can get the
requisite p articipation by offering a bond worth $ 7 5-a two-thirds to
one-third split of the surplus in the sovereign's favor. With a VAC, it
will have to offer more . Assume that if it offers a bond worth $ 8 5 , it
will get 90 percent participation under the VAC , leaving holdouts with
face value claims of $ 1 0 . The value of the $85 exchange offer IS as
follows:
$85 x . 90
$ 76 . 50 (consideration to participants)
$ 1 00 x . 1 0 $1 0. 00 (conside ration to holdouts)
$ 86.50 (total yield to bondholders)
This recovery reverses the percentage division of the surplus
now it is roughly two-thirds to the bondholders and one-third to the
sovereign. The problem lies in the possibility that too many
bondholders will hold out and defeat the offer, leaving the holders
with bonds only worth $65. Let us assume that composition failures
due to holdouts are rare-a 20 percent possibility. The question is
=

=

consent to the amendment; 24 were accompanied by tender offers; 8 were accompanied by
exchange offers; 1 was accompanied by a tender offer and an exchange offer. Id. A requirement of
an exit consent or consent as a condition to payment was present in 44 of the 48 offers for which
data could be found. Id. at 506-07. The issuers sought, inter a lia, to make leveraged acquisitions
(31 percent), make dividends or other stockholder payments ( 1 3 . 8 percent) , conduct
recapitalizations ( 1 0 . 3 percent), sell assets (8.6 percent), and issue more debt (6.9 percent) . Id. at
504 tbl. l .
The average payment offered i n those solicitations exchanging the consent for cash was
$20 . 5 1 per $ 1 ,000 face value; the median cash payment was $ 1 5 per $ 1 , 000 face value; nine of
the 23 cash offers were above $20; the two largest were $60 and $95. Id. at 5 1 1 . Evidence of the
result of the solicitation was found for 52 of the cases, and in 83 percent of these the solicitation
succeeded. Id. at 503. A statistical survey of the prices of the issues showed that 29 of 42 issues,
or 69 percent had positive abnormal returns around the time of the announcement of the
transaction: The average abnormal bond return was 2 . 34 percent, while the average abnormal
return for the stock of the is suer was 9.5 percent. Id. at 5 1 0. Thus, the study showed that the
solicitations increased the value of both the debt and the stock.
Kahan and Tuckman conclude that the issuers have not been exploiting the structural
opportunity to coerce that the bond contracts create. Id. at 5 1 3 . They hypothesize that the
bondhol ders can, in practice, coordinate their response so as to insure an adequate level of
payment. Id. As evidence, they cite the formation of bondholder groups in 12 cases; of these 12
solicitations, 1 1 either failed or had their terms modified before approval . Id. at 5 1 2 . Overall, in
42 percent of the cases, the issuers mo dified the terms after an initial failure to obtain consents.
Id.
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whether that possibility makes the CAC offer more attractive. It does
not:
8 6 . 5 0 x . 80
69.20
65.00 x . 2 0 1 3. 00
$ 8 2 . 2 0 > $75
Now say the probabilities are 50- 5 0 :
8 6 . 5 0 x . 50 4 3 . 2 5
6 5 . 0 0 x . 50 32. 50
$ 7 5 . 7 5 > $75
The expected value of the UAC exchange offer is still greater
than that of the CAC offer. Only at under a 50-50 chance of success
does the CAC create value for the creditors as a whole.
The above numbers are our invention, posed for the sake of
argument. To the extent they strike the reader as plausible, it follows
that UACs are not irrational, and CAC value is not a sure thing.
=

=

=

=

3. Exploiting Minority Creditors
Finally, CACs present a risk of opportunistic collusion between
the debtor and a maj ority of creditors to exploit a minority of the
creditors. The debtor makes a side payment to a m aj ority of the
creditors, inducing them to support a composition that reduces its
overall debt burden by extracting value from the minority creditors .
For example, the large creditors may be promised future business with
the sovereign. This is not an unlikely eventuality in the sovereign
context, where the sovereign's incentive to compromise arises largely
from a desire to return to the credit markets. Thus, respecting a
particular composition on offer, the interests of primary lenders and
bondholders from the secondary market can diverge, with the
primaries lumping returns from the composition together with returns
from proj ected new deals with the sovereign, and the secondaries
looking only to the composition . Alternatively, a sufficient fraction of
the debt may be purchased at low prices by entities symp athetic to the
sovereign. These sympathizers then validate a composition that
exploits the minority creditors. 1 9 7
With a UAC , a minority creditor does not have to worry about
majority opportunism. If it thinks the deal burdens its interest
unduly, it can hold out.

1 97.

See, e.g. , Coffee & Klein,

supra note 68.
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D. Summary

The foregoing makes us dubious of the CAC value story. But we
do not claim to have refuted it . After all, CAC bonds have been issued
for more than a century in London without friction or objection. But
we do claim to have refuted the charge that bondholder objections to
CAC exchanges (and sovereign bankruptcy) stem only from
opportunism related to IMF b ailouts. This leads us to pre dict that
there will be no spontaneous move for universal CACs. If the
contractual strategy is to accomplish anything, the IMF, the United
States Treasury, and the other G - 7 nations will have to do more than
simply induce an initial move. The question they need to ask is: What
steps will make the move pervasive and stable?
V. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND GOOD FAITH
Movement to CACs began in 2003, evidenced by several New
York bond issues and successful exchange offers . 19 8 Where then do we
find ourselves? To the extent the CAC-UAC preference differential is
narrow and historically grounded, these recent transactions could
herald a preference shift. But, to the extent the preference differential
is based on considerations from the core of the debtor-creditor
incentive structure, the transactions could amount to only an isolated
episode . One could then see movement back toward UACs in new bond
issues (and in any exchange offers, as a sweetener) .
Either way, the new e quilibrium sought by CAC proponents
could be destabilized if collusive behavior skews the results of
restructurings for the benefit of maj ority creditor coalitions. This could
happen when a majority of bondholders approves a restructuring that
allocates most of the surplus to the sovereign in exchange for the
sovereign's promise of future lending business. Alternatively, a one
sided deal could result when a large p ercentage of the debt is held by
nationals of the sovereign (or other sympathetic entities) . If such
incidents occurred, it would not take long for the markets to move
back to UACs, which provide an effective, if crude, mode of preve ntion.
It follows that a stable contractual transition to CACs presupposes the
control of side deals. This control could come from contract drafting or,
alternatively, from the backstop regime of contract law (specifically,
the good faith duty) .

1 98 . See Elmar B. Koch, Collective Actio n Clauses-The Way Fo rward, GEO. J. INT'L
20 04) .

(forthcoming

L.
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In this Part we argue that judges interpreting and applying
CAC bond contracts under New York law should take the initiative
and sculpt a regime of intercreditor good faith duties adequate to
p olice collusion and other opportunism on the part of bondholders of
distressed sovereigns .
A. Co ntract Drafting Versus Judicial Intervention

We confront at the outset the argument that sovereigns and
bondholders desiring to prohibit collusion will draft appropriate
exclusions in their contracts' voting provisions. Under this view of
contract law, the good faith duty operates as a gap filler that prevents
opportunism that the parties would have contracted to prohibit had
they thought of the contingency at the outset. Where, however, the
contingency was well-known to the parties ex ante, and they made no
provision preventing it, no constraint on self-interested conduct is
imposed ex post. Since the parties know about the possibility, their
silence implies consent . Even if consent cannot be implied on the facts
of the case, the j udge should still refrain from intervention in order to
force p arties to draft better contracts . 1 99
In the case of CAC bond contracts, the opportunistic action at
issue-the debtor colluding with a majority of creditors to exploit the
minority-would likely be envisioned at the outset by the parties. As
we have seen, fear of such opportunistic behavior is a primary
explanation for the century-long use of UACs. It arguably follows that
if market actors omit a direct prohibition of collusion in connection
with a considered move to CACs, they must not want one.
Alternatively, since the presence or absence of a prohibition could bear
on the contract price, the creditors must be unwilling to pay the price
of the extra protective term. Finally, the creditors may be relying on
reputational markets . Where markets impose reputational costs on
misbehaving debtors-for example, by rmsing their costs of
borrowing-and the court system is both expensive and error prone,
creditors may rationally decide not to purchase the right to go to court.
We question this line of reasoning from start to finish, reciting
our objections from finish to start.
The reference to reputational enforce ment posits that creditors
prefer reputational sanctions over court-based enforcement. Borrowers
who misbehave towards their creditors do suffer reputationally. But,
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 3 6
& ECON. 425, 426, 445 (1 993); Jason Scott Johnston, Op ting In and Op ting Out: Barga in ing

1 99 . See, e.g,
J.L.

for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ve ntures, 7 0 WAS H . U. L . Q . 2 9 1 , 3 2 4 - 2 5 , 3 2 9 - 3 0 ( 1 9 92) .
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as we have seen, the sovereign debt market specializes in long-term
More importantly, even if market reputational
forgiveness. 2 oo
sanctions were significant and there were correspondingly high costs
of litigation, it does not follow that creditors would avoid putting a
protective term in the contract, if indeed a suitably drafted term were
available. Sovereign creditors already contract for numerous
enforcement provisions, despite the fact that direct enforcement
opportunities rarely occur. Avoiding the costs of going to court does
not seem to be a concern that determines the terms of sovereign debt
contracts .
Moving to the implication of consent from knowledge , drawing
inferences from contract silence about what the p arties wanted at the
drafting table is a risky busines s . The parties could make either of two
provisions respecting good faith: They could specify that the contract
is governed by a good faith duty, or, if the parties wanted no backstop
protection, they could explicitly exclude good faith review. As a
predictive matter, each alternative seems equally likely. Yet neither
shows up in bond contracts, even though the current default position
of the law is somewhat unclear in the sovereign context. It follows that
the problem here cannot be solved as a matter of volition. What we
have is instead a normative problem: The burden to draft explicitly
must be allocated to one party or the other and this allocation stems
from a normative choice on the part of the judge.
Finally, we reach the argument that refraining from
intervention force s the parties to draft explicitly. This presupposes
that a complete menu of contingent contract terms is available to the
parties. The sovereign context, however, is full of unforeseeable
contingencies, a matter made worse by problems of observability and
verifiability . 20 1 Much of good faith and fiduciary law exists to provide
e x post solutions resp ecting such non-contractable subj ect m atter.
We suspect that this is also the case where the experts do not
know how to draft explicit prohibitions.20 2 Even though opportunistic

200. See su.p ra text accompanying notes 36-39.
2 0 1 . For contributions to the literature making this point, see Sa nford Grossman & Oliver
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership : A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J .
P OL . ECON. 6 9 1 (1 986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomp lete Contracts and Renego tiation, 5 6
E C ONOMETRICA 755 (1 988) . See also Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom , Multitasl� Principal
Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Jo b Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & O RG . 24
( 1 99 1 ) (showing that contracts that tie an agent's comp ensation to verifiable measures can divert
effort and attention from other more important b ut less easily measured aspects of performance) .
202. That the creditor community is concerned about problems of opportunities arising as a
result of CACs is evidenced by the recent attempts to draft a "code of conduct." See Angela
Pruitt, Conduct Code in Emerging Ma rl�ets Bridges Difference, Dow JONES CAP. MARKETS REP . ,
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collusion betwe � n the debtor and a majority of its creditors is a known
possibility with CACs , it can show up in infinite guises. 203 For
example, the contract could provide that any bondholder with a
commitment to lend to the bond issuer loses its vote. But a lender in
discussions with the sovereign about a future deal would not be picked
up by such a provision. Indeed, such conversations arguably should
not come at the cost of the vote and are hard to observe in the b argain.
Yet ex post, the conversation could occasion conduct viewed as bad
faith. Specificity with respect to prohibited relationships, such as bond
holding by entities controlled by the sovereign (who might later
collude with the sovereign against external lenders) , also creates a
risk of overcoverage. What one era views as a suspect relationship can
be deemed harmless by the next generation.2 0 4 Things like insider
borrowing-for example, a sovereign selling bonds to state run
entities-can be beneficial to the external creditors in cases where the
insiders are the only ones willing to lend.
In sum, determining whether there has been opportunism that
traverses the line of good faith involves a fact intensive, "you know it
when you see it" analysis . The job of policing therefore re quire s an
adj udicator.
B. Good Faith, Fi nancial Co ntracts, and So vereign Deb t u nder CA Cs

But will the courts take responsibility and police sovereign debt
restructurings? Presumably, the proj ected CAC bonds still will be
governe d by the law of New York. But there is precious little New
York law either on intercre ditor duties specifically or sovereign bond
law more generally. It is likely, then, that a court confronted with the
good faith case posited here would look at general corporate bond law
and attempt to translate it to the sovereign context. Unfortunately,
good faith duties have been found to be essentially
nonexistent in the
.
corporate bond context.
We argue that a successful contractual transition to CACs
would j ustify a move backwards in time from today's barren good faith
June 1 8 , 2003. Perhaps more importantly, the one full scale move from UAC s to CACs , that of
Uruguay, has provisions in it that take a first step at protecting against debtor opportunism. See
Felix Salmon, Uruguay Closes a Loophole, EUROMONEY, May 2003, at 1 0 1 , 1 0 l .
203. See Jennifer Arlen, Designing Mechanisms t o Govern TaJ�eover Defenses: Pri vate
Contracting, Legal In tervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies, 6 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 1 7, 926·28
(2002) .
204. This happened with the Trust Indenture Act, which as originally drafted offered a long
list of prohibited trustee relationships, all of which were deleted by the Congre ss in an
amendment thirty years later. S. REP. NO. 1 0 1 - 1 55 ( 1 989).
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landscape to precedent fro m the late nineteenth and e arly twentieth
centuries, when courts demonstrated more of a willingness to step in
and block opportunistic b ehavior by creditors against e ach other.205
We propose a trade. For years, the official sector has been pleading for
CACs . Under pressure, the markets have reluctantly taken initial
steps towards them .206 We argue that there is a necessary "give back"
to support further forward movement and import long term stability:
Judicial policing of the opportunistic use of CACs in restructurings.
The trade implies costs for the domestic public sector, in the form of
additional work for certain courts. But that extra cost seems minimal
in comparison to the benefits gained from process improvements in
sovereign restructurings . 20 7
1 . The Negation of Good Faith
Recent generations of cases on bondholder rights teach that
lending
relationships
are
arm's-length
transactions
among
sophisticated parties and that, absent an explicit contract term, there
are no constraints on borrower or intercreditor opportunism.2 0 8 The
courts start with the premise that sophisticated parties enter into
bond contracts; parties capable of negotiating for the terms they
want. 209 For a court to imply additional terms, ex post, would be to
frustrate their intent and add uncertainty.

205. See infra notes 234·240 and accomp anying text.
206. In 1 9 98 there was a bond issue by Thailand that was done with CACs, but this may
have been an aberration. See ELECTRICITY G ENERATING AUTHORITY OF THAILAl'\lD, OFFERING
CIRCULAR (Oct. 1 3 , 1 998) (on file with authors) . The most recent move towards attempting CACs
began with the filing of a shelf offering by Mexico (presumably under United States pressure)
where the stated intent was to use 75 percent majority action provisions for payment terms. See
John Authers, Mexico Pioneers Plan to Ease Debt, FIN. TIM E S , Feb . 2 5 , 2003, at 2 5 , 2002 WL
1 4 1 78460.
207. The analysis of good faith in the sovereign context in this Article, builds on a
preliminary treatment in Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 1 04, at 1 3 39-42.
208. There are a number of articles tackling the bondholder- stockholder conflict. See
Caroline M. Gentile , Allocating Risk and Control: The Role of Bond Covenants in Corporate
Governance, U.C. DAVI S L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (reviewing the literature) . In 2003, we have
seen Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, South Mrica, Turkey, and Korea, among others, move to
experimenting with CACs in their New York law bonds. Even prior to this , isolated issuances to
countries like Lebanon and Qatar were not eno ugh to garner attention, let alone produce any
momentum for a market shift to CACs. On the prior issues, see MARK GUGIATTI & ANTHONY
RICHARDS, Do COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES INFLUENCE BOND YIELDS? NEW EVIDENCE FROM
EMERGING MARKETS 5-8 (Reserve Bank of Austl. , Research Discussion Paper No . RPD 2003-02,
2003), http://www.rba.gov. au/rdp/RD P200 3-02.pdf.
209. See Sharon Steel Corp . v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 6 9 1 F.2d 1 0 39, 1 049 (2d Cil'.
1 9 82) ; see also Katz v. Oak Indus . , Inc . , 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1 986) .

66

VANDERBILT LA W REVIE W

[Vol . 5 7 : 1

Accordingly, interpretation proceeds within the four corners of
the contract, even when a good faith breach is alleged.2 10 The rule is
that no fiduciary or good faith duties run from the debtor to the
bondholders unless the opportunistic conduct violates an explicit
clause of the contract . This rule has been articulated despite black
letter law that all contracts are subj ect to an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. As articulated in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, good faith is a backstop duty intended to protect parties
who do not have specific contract provisions to protect them . 2 1 1 In the
maj ority of cases, to require a contract term first, as the rule for bonds
does, is to say "no good faith duty ."2 1 2
To make out a claim for a breach of the narrow good faith duty
that applies to bond contracts , the bondholder plaintiff must
demonstrate that it is clear from the "express terms" of the contract
that a particular implied contract term would have been included in
the contract if the parties had negotiated over it .2 1 3 The result is that,
to the extent a debtor takes an action pursuant to an express clause of
the contract, the good faith argument is cut off.2 1 4 The court will not
step in when the debtor (or creditor) takes an action pursuant to the
express terms of the agreement, even if it happens to substantially
impair the realization of another party's contractual expectations .
2 . Narrow Good Faith and Intercreditor Relationships
The leading intercreditor case is Aladdin Ho tel Co. v . Bloom , 2 1 5
decided by the Eighth Circuit in 1 9 5 3 . It concerned an issue of real

2 1 0. See William W. Bratton, Corporate Debt Re lationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 9 2 , 1 2 0 n . 1 2 3 (citing Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v.
Empire , Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673 ( 1994) (holding that an implied covenant of good faith derives
substance directly fro m Indenture's language and cannot give debenture holders any rights
inconsistent with those set out in the Indentures) and Katz, - 508 A.2d at 879 n . 7 (holding that a
corporation's duty of good faith to bondholders diffe rs fro m its duty to stockholders» .
2 1 1 . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 204 cmt.d, 205 cmt.a ( 1 98 1 ) .
2 1 2 . See William W. Bratton, Venture Cap ital o n the Downside: Preferred Stoch and
Corporate Control, 1 00 MICH. L. REV. 89 1 , 933-3 4 (2002) .
2 1 3 . Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992
(Del. 1998) ; Katz, 508 A.2d at 880; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, I nc . , 7 1 6 F. Sup p .
1 50 4 , 1 5 1 7 (S.D. N.Y. 1989) (holding that a covenant o f good faith and fair dealing is implied only
where the implied term is consistent with other mutually agreed upon terms in the contract) .
2 1 4. See Me tro. L ife Ins. Co. , 7 1 6 F. Supp. at 1 5 1 7 ("In contracts like bond indentures, 'an
implied covenant . . . derives its substance directly fro m the language of the Indenture and
cannot give the holders of Debentures any rights inconsistent with those set out in the
Indenture.'" (quoting Gardner & Florence, 589 F. Supp. at 673 (internal quotation marks
omitted» ) .
2 1 5. 200 F . 2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953).

2 00 4]

SOVEREIGN DEB T REFORM

67

estate bonds left over from a depression era composition. Interest was
payable at 5 percent out of income only until maturity, which was
after ten years. 2 16 Thereafter, if the bonds were not paid down,
interest was an absolute 8 percent, a high coupon in those days . 21 7
Before the tenth anniversary, a group holding a maj ority of the stock
of the issuer purchased a m aj ority of the bonds .2ls Unfortunately for
the bondholder minority, the bonds contained a CAC. The CAC gave
the dual maj ority a simple expedient on the tenth anniversary: Amend
the bonds to extend the maturity date another ten years . 2 19 The 5
percent out of income interest provision was thereby also extended. 220
This, as a practical matter, assured that no proceeds of the enterprise
ever entered the pockets of the minority bondholders-insiders e asily
can manipulate things so that no "income" ever will exist. Had the
securities been common stock, majority to minority fiduciary duties
would have been available to protect the minority on this "freeze out"
fact pattern. But the Eighth Circuit slammed the door in the minority
bondholders' faces. 221
Aladdin Ho tel was decided before the articulation of the
contemporary contract law good faith duty. But the case's spirit
activates the later intercreditor cases. Most have arisen in the
syndicated loan context. The courts proceed from the premise that the
parties are sophisticated commercial actors who have entered into an
arm's-length contract. Given this premise, the courts will not imply
good faith duties unless the parties expressly contract for them. 2 2 2
Hence, in First National Bank Ass 'n v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
2 16 . Id. at 628.
2 1 7 . Id.
2 1 8 . Id.
2 19 . Id.
220. Id.
2 2 1 . Id . at 633.
222. E.g., First Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. , 919 F.2d 5 1 0,
5 1 4 (9th Cir. 1990) ; Aaron Ferer & Sons Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 1 F . 2 d 1 1 2 , 122 (2d
Cir. 1 98 4) ; Banco Urquijo, S .A. v. Signet Bank, 861 F. Supp. 1220, 1 2 49 (M. D . Pa. 1 994) ; Banque
Arabe Et Internationale D'Investissement v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 8 1 9 F . Supp. 1 2 8 2 , 1 2 96 (S . D . N .Y.
1993); Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 4 5 (S . D . N .Y. 1 9 9 1 ) .

There is one N e w York c a s e that suggests that creditors i n syndicated loan agreements have
meaningful obligations in the context of pursuing legal action against the debt. Credit Francais
Int'l, S .A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C A , 490 N.y' S.2d 670, 684 (N .Y. Sup. Ct. 1 9 85) .
As the bulk of the case law cited demonstrates, however, this case has had little impact. For
criticisms of the case, see Lee C. Buchheit, Is Syndicated Lending a Jo int Venture ?, INT'L FIN. L .
REV . , Aug . 1 985, a t 1 2 ; Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reiser, The Effec t o f the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Process on Inter-creditor Re lationships, 1988 U. ILL. L . REV. 493 , 502-04. See also
Jeffery N. Brooks, Pa rticipation and Syndicated Loans: Intercreditor Fiduciary Duties fo r Lead
and Agent Banhs Under U. S. Law, BUTTERWORTH J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L . , June 1995, at 2 7 5 .
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Co m merce, when a group of banks in a syndicate entered into a
standstill agreement with the borrower following a missed interest
payment, the court rejected a minority member's argument that the
maj ority was obliged to declare a default. 223 Similarly, in New Bank of
New England v. Toro nto-Dominion Bank, when a maj ority of the
lenders did not vote to accelerate the debt , despite the occurrence of an
event of default, the court refused a minority lender's complaint that
the maj ority was obliged to vote to accelerate.224
The syndicated bank loan cases, although rej ecting a
mainstream good faith inquiry, can be read narrowly on their facts.
Thus read, they stand for the proposition that when a maj oritarian
modification occurs in a distress situation, includes an e qual payout to
all the creditors, and involves no side deal between the maj ority and
the debtor, no violation of duties to the minority occurs .225 Aladdin
Hotel presents more of a problem . It specifically involves bonds and
sustains a maj oritarian amendment of the bond contract that effects a
manifestly unfair transfer of wealth from the minority to the m aj ority.
One recent case, however, that does protect a bondholder
minority is Federated Strategic Income Fu nd v. Mechala Group
Jamaica, Ltd.22 6 There, a federal district court in New York b arred an
Exit Amendment offer that looked unfair to minority holders . 227 The
amendments in question, effected under a CAC, would have
essentially stripped the debtor corporation of all of its assets and left
the dissenting creditors with only a shell against which to pursue
their claims. A strict reading of the precedent on coercive exchange
offers suggested that the debtor owed no significant good faith duty.
The court, however, faced with the unfairness of the offer, had little
trouble in deciding to block the transaction. 228

2 2 3 . No. 3-93-366, 1 995 U . S . Dist LEXIS 12 1 0 5 , at * 1 4 (D . Minn. June 9, 1 995) .
224. 768 F . Supp . 1 0 1 7 , 102 1 - 2 2 (S . D . N .Y. 1991); see also Yucyco, Ltd. v . Republic o f Slov n . ,
9 8 4 F. Sup p . 209, 2 2 1 (S . D . N.Y. 1 997) (rejecting minority creditor's claim that agent w a s obliged

to declare an event of default and accelerate the debt-where the indenture required permission
from the maj ority creditors to accelerate-even though the particular minority holder had been
excluded from participating in the offer) .
2 2 5 . In any event, syndicated loan disputes do not translate easily to the context of a large
sovereign bond issue because the relationships among creditors in a syndicated loan tend to be
tighter and the creditors are likely to be more sophisticated (generally banks and other financial
institutions) than in the bond context.
226. No. 99 CIV 105 1 7 HB, 1999 WL 993648 (S . D . N .Y. Nov. 2, 1 999). For a discussion of the
case, see Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 7 4 , at 73.
227. Federated Strategic, 1999 WL 993648, at *7, 1 0 .
2 2 8 . Id. a t * 10 . Similarly, i n a later Yucyco case incarnation fro m the o n e discussed above,
Judge Chin was faced with a somewhat harsh action by the majority creditors. Yucyco, Ltd . v.
Republic of Slovn., 1999 WL 169530 (S . D . N .Y. Mar. 2 5 , 1 999). What the majority creditors did
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The bottom line still is that the case law gives a m aj ority of
cr�ditors wide rein in amending the terms of a bond contract pursuant
to an express term. But Mechala at least suggests that the door could
open for claims of bondholder maj ority to minority oppression. The
case becomes stronger when reference is made to cases antedating
Aladdin Ho tel.
3. The Special Case of Sovereign Debt
Assume that the courts are not about to reconsider their
rej ection of good faith duties in the corporate bondholder context .
There is nevertheless a case for an exception for sovereign bonds.
The contemporary rej ection of intercreditor duties occurred in
the shadow of Chapter 1 1 and its predecessors. Inside Chapter 1 1 , a
fiduciary re gime including intercreditor duties comes to bear. 2 29 This
protective regime takes tentative steps in pre-bankruptcy distress
situations,23o but self-protection by contract otherwise prevails outside
of bankruptcy. The implicit j udgment is that when they really need

was t o consent t o release the obligor banks fro m any and all claims under the prior debt
agreement. Id. at *2. Yucyco had not been permitted to participate in the exchange agreement
and yet had also lost its claims against the obligor banks. Id. As a formal matter, the court ruled
that the action of the majority creditors violated a "no amendment" clause. Id. But a plausible
argument was made by the defendants that this clause only applied to those items that had been
carved out as exceptions to the majority Modification clause. [d. at *3. The court, however, went
to something like a good faith rationale in saying: "A creditor would not have been likely to loan
substantial sums under an agre ement that would permit important rights-such as the ability to
seek payment fro m certain obligors-to be extinguished by a simple vote of the majority of
creditors ." Id.; see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and De btor Opportunism: In Bad
Times and Good, 1 05 HA.RV. L. REV. 1 82 1 , 1 8 3 3 ( 1 992) ("Even if the terms of the bond contract
did not contain a term that expressly prohibited the debtor or its controlling stockholders from
voting on amendments, it is hard to i magine any court today that would interpret a 'majority
consent' provision to validate such a stripping of bondholders' entitlements." (footnote omitted)).
229. Under Bankruptcy Code section 1 1 2 9(b) , a reorganization plan may not "discriminate
unfairly." This is not a strict rule of pro rata treatment. Since the Code literally prohibits only
"unfair" discrimination, by implication it allows for discriminatory departures from pro rata
treatment so long as they are not "unfair." The ju stification is that the plan allocates a "surplus"
over liquidation value to which all creditors have not made a proportionate contribution. 7
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY � 1 1 29.04 [3] [b] (Resnick et al. eds . , 15th ed. rev. 1996).
The le ading case, In re Aztec Co . , 1 0 7 B.R. 585, 590 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989), offers a four
part test to determine whether discrimination is unfair: ( 1 ) whether the discrimination has a
reasonable basis, (2) whether the debtor can confirm a plan that does not discriminate, (3)
whether the discrimination is in good faith; and (4) how the plan treats the classes discriminated
against. For a critical discussion, see Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair
Discriminatl:on in Chapter 1 1 , 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 ( 1 9 98) .
230. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINAN C E : CASES AND MATERIALS 275 -90 (5th ed.
2002) (describing application of fraudulent conveyance law and fiduciary duty to protect creditors
in financial distress situations).
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it-in severe distress situations-bondholders get protection. But, so
long as the bond is paying, no solicitude need be extended. 2 3 1
Sovereign debt is different because no bankruptcy regime
protects sovereign cre ditors. It follows that bond contract law that
assumes bankruptcy's availability does not translate well to the
context of a distressed sovereign.232 The doctrine, in effect, has a gap .
We would fill it by having a judge interpolate good faith intercreditor
duties in distress situations , especially in cases of opportunistic
behavior on the part of a bondholder group .
There i s precedent with which to fill this gap . T o find this case
law we have to look to the period prior to the creation of the federal
bankruptcy reorganization regime.233 During that era, distressed
corporate bond issuers and bondholders struggled in an environment
not dissimilar from that facing sovereign issuers and bondholders.
Unsurprisingly, the case law on bonds and bond contracts was
different. 2 34
The early twentieth century commentary suggests that a
maj ority of creditors seeking to impose a restructuring plan on a
The
dissenting minority owed the minority fiduciary duties. 2 :3 5
description of the duties as "fiduciary" may sound extreme today, but
in those days the term also covered territory covered by today's good
faith duty . Both commentators and judges from the period
contemplated that a maj ority- driven debt restructuring, in which
dissenting minorities were taking a haircut, would be subj ect to
scrutiny. 23 6 Leading cases such as the Second Circuit's decision in

2 3 1 . See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc . , 7 1 6 F . Supp . 1 504 (S D N . Y . 19 89) .
232. Cf. Tarullo, SlLp ra note 9, at 633 -40 (explaining how the differences between sovereigns
and companies make it difficult to translate laws that govern companies to the sovereign
context) .
233. On the fe deralization of bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel, Jr. , Rethinhing the Line
Between Corporate Law and Corporate Banl�rup tcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 4 7 1 , 490- 5 1 2 ( 1 994) .
234. Bratton, supra note 2 1 0, at 1 1 8 n. 1 14 (citing Francis Lynde Stetson, Preparation of
Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral Trusts and Debenture Indentures, in STETSON ET AL. ,
SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANC I NG, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 25-27 ( 1 9 1 7)
(j ustifying complexity of trust indentures, not on ground that no legal protection exists, but on
ground that implied-in-law protection is too uncertain» .
235. See, e.g. , Charles H . Haines, Jr. , Corporations-Modification Provis ions of Corporate
Mo rtgages and Trust Indentures, 38 M I C H . L. REV. 63, 67 ( 1 9 39) .
236. See Billyou, supra note 1 7 7, at 596-97 (describing the applicable law in England and
Canada and noting that modifications in the United States were subj ect to similar restrictions in
terms of court scrutiny); cf. Note, The Rights and Remedies of the Bondholder Under Corporate
Bonds and Indentures, 27 COLUM. L. REV . 679, 584-86 ( 1 9 2 7) (stating that the majority
bondholders were assumed to be acting in the best interests of the bond class, but suggesting
that the courts were especially concerned with collusive arrangement between the debtor and the
majority creditors).
.

.
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Hackettstown National Bank v . D. G. Yue ngling Brewing CO. 237 have
never been explicitly overruled. 23 8
The high water mark for discussions of maj ority-minority
intercreditor duties was the period between 1 890 and 1 93 0 . The cases
and articles discussing them tended to involve the e quity receivership .
This was a j udicial device used in the pre-bankruptcy reorganization
era to assist firms, particularly railroads, whose distress implied
economic j eo pardy for the community as a whole . In those days,
federal bankruptcy meant liquidation, which made no sense because
the railroads were worth more as going concerns than as liquidate d
entities, and the economy depended on them in any event. The
distressed railroads were interstate entities, so state insolvency
receivership laws were inadequate to tackle their problems, and there
was no federal corporate reorganization mechanism. Hence, with the
urging and assistance of Wall Street l awyers, most prominently Paul
Cravath, the federal courts stepped in to supervise restructurings. 2 39
A creditor would go to a j udge and ask for the appointment of a
receiver to take control of the debtor's assets . Eventually a creditor
majority would present a plan to the j udge (a plan engineered by
insider shareholders, and their lawyers and investment bankers) . The
j udge would issue a decree that would enjoin creditors from enforcing
their claims against the reorganized corporation by using means other
than those provided for in the decree. Maj ority bondholders owed
relatively strong obligations to behave fairly towards minorities .
The precise contours o f the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century theory of intercreditor rights are difficult to discern, given
that the j udicial opinions are context specific . Yet, we think it is clear

237. 74 F. 1 1 0 ( 2 d Cir. 1 89 6) .

238. Hackettstown has language suggesting that creditors owe each other fiduciary duties.
ld. at 1 1 2 - 1 4 . For the most part, however, the modern day bond cases do not mention it (perhaps
because the lawyers are not aware of it and do not raise it before the court). One recent case that
did tackle Had:ettstown was CIBC Banh & Trust Co. (Cayman) u . Banco Central do Brasil, 886
F. Supp. 1 1 0 5 , 1 1 1 5 n . 8 (S . D . N .Y. 1995). In ClBC, the plaintiffs were asking that the court rule
in their favor against what looked to be a collusive arrangement between the debtor and a large
debt holder (one of the debtor's instrumentalities) on the basis of the implied duties of good faith
among creditors. ld. at 1 1 1 4 . The CIBC court ignored the broad language in Haclwttstown that
suggested fiduciary type duties existing among creditors and instead distinguished Hachettstown
by p ointing to the different factually situation there . leZ. at 1 1 1 5 n.8.
239. For a description of these equity receiverships that sets them in the context of a history
of the developments in United States ba nkruptcy law, see DAVID SKEEL, JR . , D E BT'S DOMINION: A
H I STORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ArvlERICA

(2 001).
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that the level of concern for creditor rights during this period was
higher than it has b een since World War I I . 240
4. English Intercreditor Duties
The commentators tell us that meaningful intercreditor duties
also obtained in English law during the early portion of the last
century.2 4 1 That voice of English authority faded during the course of
the twentieth century, however. But, unlike United States contract
law, today's English law does not interpolate a line of cases that
rejects the proposition of good faith scrutiny of bond contracts. Until
recently, there simply were no cases . Meanwhile, British bond issues,
domestic and sovereign, have employed CACs, while British bank loan
contracts have tracked United States practice and combined UAC s
and CACs . 242
The period of silence ended recently with the decision of
Redwood Master Fund Ltd. u . TD Bank Europe Ltd. by the High Court
in London.2 43 This intercreditor case suggests the possibility of goo d
faith scrutiny. The case involved a syndicated loan arrangement under
which the payment terms were covere d by a UAC and the secondary
terms by a CAC. The debtor was in distress. A default on one of its
borrowings had triggered a cross default prOVISIOn in the
instruments-"tranche A"-upon which the plaintiffs had purchased
exposure. The debtor had not yet drawn down the tranche A funds .
Given the default, it had no right to do so, which was fine with the
plaintiffs . The plaintiffs' problem was that other tranches had been
drawn down and the majority of the lenders held interests in both the
undrawn tranche A and the already- drawn tranches . A conflict of
interest resulted: Those who had already loaned money (and had not
been repaid) wanted to keep lending from tranche A because the loan
proceeds would flow through to repay the obligations from the other
240. Indeed, in the D epression era, bondholder interests appear to have been the primary
concern of the courts, legislatures, and policy makers . See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means
Reconsidered at the Century 's Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 748 (2 0 0 1 ) ; David A. Skeel, Jr. , An
Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND . L. R EV. 1 32 5 , 1 3 7 4 7 5 ( 1998 ) .
2 4 1 . See Billyou, supra note 1 7 7 , at 596-97 (citing materials) .
242. See ARMOUR & DEAKIN, supra note 1 84 .
2 4 3 . 2002 W L 3 1 676297 (Ch. Dec. 1 1 , 2002) . Given the rarity o f such cases, the case received
considerable attention in the press (leading to articles with provocative titles such as "Bankers
win court battle over the future of lending") and that brought it to our attention. E.g., Rob
Mannix, Banlwrs Win Court Battle over the Future of Lending, INT'L FIN. L . REV . , Jan., 2003, at
4, 4 - 5 ; Best Interests of Lenders Paramount, TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2003, 2003 WL 3 1 00029;
Majority BanI,s: Authority, PLC MAG . , Jan. 1 , 2003, 2003 WL 1 2 877470.
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tranches . Those who had not loaned, however, had n o desire to see
their money be put to use for that purpose by a distressed company.
The clause governing a waiver of the default was a CAC . An 80
percent creditor maj ority used the CAC to waive the default.244
Plaintiffs challenge d, arguing that the maj ority's action violated the
maj ority's implied obligation to exercise its CAC power "in the best
interests of the class as a whole ."245
The court recognized that the maj ority had an obligation to
exercise its amendment power in good faith, but it found the plaintiffs'
reading of the good faith duty too expansive . The implied duty of good
faith, said the court, protected against actions that were "dishonest
abuses" of majority power and amounted to "fraud."246 Alternatively,
plaintiffs could win if they were to demonstrate that the exercise of
maj ority power had been "motivated by a malicious wish to damage or
oppress the interests of the minority ."2 47 The duty did not extend so
far as to require that the maj ority make no changes that hurt one
subgroup more than another. It was in order to enable effective
decision making in such situations, the court explained, that the
decision-m aking power had been delegated to the maj ority.24 8 The
minority's good faith reading, in contrast, amounted to a minority veto
right.249
The court stated that these cases have to be decided on their
individual facts and scrutinized for bad faith or fraud.250 On the facts
of the case, it found that the waiver was beneficial for the holders of
tranche A as a whole and that there was no bad faith or manifest
unfairness .25 1 Taken together, this suggests that, despite the outcome,
English courts will scrutinize the merits of cases where minorities
challenge the majority's action on a CAC. It is less clear whether the
case implies that good faith scrutiny was an active possibility in

2 44. [d. Subsequently, the consent of over 95 percent of the creditors in value was obtaine d .
[d.

245. [d. In making their argument, plaintiffs pointed to the j udgment in a 1 927 dispute
between majority and minority shareholders, British America Nickel Corp., Ltd. u . M. J. O 'B rien,
Ltd. , [1 927] A.C. 369, 371 (P. C . 1 927) , where Viscount Haldane said: " [T] he Power given [under
majority voting provisions] must be exercised for the purpose of benefiting the class as a whole,
and not merely individual members only. " Redwood Master Fund, 2002 WL 3 1 676297.
246. [d.
247. [d.
248. [d. Plus, the parties in a syndicated loan arrangement were sophisticated p arties who
knew what kind of arrangement they were getting into at the outset. [d.
249. [d.
250. [d.
2 5 1 . [d.
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England throughout the twentieth century, thereby helping to explain
the p ersistence of CACs in London issue bonds . But some inferences
can be drawn. The p arties in Redwood Fu nd vigorously contested
what the common law precedents dictated, suggesting that the
historical practice did not predict a clear result. At the same time, the
abs ence of recent case law, taken together with the serious reception
accorded the plaintiffs argument, suggests a standing expectation of
j u dicial scrutiny. 25 2
5 . The Contrary View

We fight a rear guard action in arguing for good faith. At first
cut, the sovereign context looks much the same as the traditional
corporate one. Sophisticated parties enter into detailed contracts. The
sovereign debt cases from recent years suggest that courts view things
this way.

2 5 2 . A hint as to the historical understandings of intercreditor obligations is also contained
in a recent review of a private bankruptcy settlement b y the Supreme Court of Judicature. In
reaching its decision that the private settlement was void, the court found that there was an
implicit good faith duty among creditors. Somji v. Cadbury Schweppes, PLC, 2000 WL 1 8 8 1 249
(Ch. Dec. 20, 2000) .The court, although explicit that it was not relying on cases prior to 1996,
stated that
the deputy ju dge's impressive survey of old law [predating the Bankruptcy
Act of 1 996] shows that in relation to compositions and arrangement with
creditors the court did impose a strict requirement of good faith as between
competing unsecured creditors . . . [and although] there is no strong
presumption that a similar presumption must be found in the new regime
[created in 19 96] . . . (to put it at its lowest) it would be no great surprise to
find it in there in one form or another.
Id.
Although we articulated intercreditor duties as good faith obligations, an English court
might also characterize them as either fiduciary or implied duties. English law appears to
contemplate both possibilities. On fiduciary duties, E nglish law appears to keeps a fairly open
definition of such duties and often adds fiduciary relationships as it sees fit. See J. Beatson,
ANSON'S LAW O F CONTRACT 2 6 7 · 68 (28th ed. 2002) . The three broad categories of fiduciary duties
that already exist are as follows : relationships of trust and confidence; relationships of
p owerlinfluence/discretion; and relationships of confidentiality. See P.J. Millett, Equity 's Place i n
t h e Law of Co mmerce, 1 14 LAW Q. REV. 2 1 4 , 2 1 9 · 2 1 ( 1 998) ; see also Alexander F.R. Lokem,
Fiduciary Duties and Imp lied Duties of Good Faith in Co ntractual Jo int Ventures, J . B . L. at 5505 6 (Nov. 1 999) . One could argue that intercreditor duties fit either of the first two categorie s.
Moving to implied duties (and it is worth noting that the judge in Redwood Masters used the
concepts of "good faith" and "implied duties" interchangeably at times), there a p pear to be three
types of implied terms: (1) terms that the parties probably had in mind but did not bother to add
in the contract, (2) terms that the parties, regardless if they had them in mind, would have
agreed to if the issue was raised, and (3) terms that, regardless of whether they had them in
mind, would have added to the contract if they had foreseen the difficulty. Glanville Williams,
Language and the Law, 6 1 LAW Q. REV. 7 1 , 401 ( 1 945) . Depending on context, interCl'editor
duties could fit into any one of the three ca tegories.
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In Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Pop ular del Per u ,
the borrower's lawyers argued that the court should u s e principles of
comity to thwart an enforcement action by a holdout creditor.253 The
S econd Circuit s aid no . Writing for the panel, Judge Calabresi
explained that the United States interest in allowing contract
e nforcement actions trumped the need for a smooth debt resolution
process:
First, the United States encourages participation in, and advocates the success of, IMF
foreign debt resolution procedures under the Brady Plan, Second, the United States has
a strong interest in ensuring the enforceability of valid debts under the principles of
contract law, and in particular, the continuing enforceability of foreign debts owed to
United States lenders, The second interest limits the first so that, although the United
States advocates negotiations to effect debt reduction and continued lending to
defaulting foreign sovereigns, it maintains that creditor participation in such
negotiations should be on a strictly voluntary b asis, It also requires that debts remain
enforceable throughout the negotiations,254

Similarly, in El liott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacio n,2 55
the same court rej ected another sovereign plea. This time the request
was that the court use principles of champerty to block the holdout
creditor's actions.256 The court quoted Judge Calabresi's language fro m
Pravin Bankers and explained that i t was not going t o take a n action
against the holdout creditor that in effect produced an involuntary
"cram down."257 We point these cases out to flag two things. First,
their tone is hostile to the notion of intercreditor obligations. Second,
that hostility appears to follow from the courts' perception of United
States interests. We discuss the importance of the second point later .
Finally, CIBC Banh & Trust Co. (Cay man) v. Banco Central do
Bras il2 58 involved a sovereign debtor, an intercreditor dispute , and a
discussion of intercreditor law from the turn of the twentieth century.
CIBC Bank bears a factual resemblance to Aladdin Hotel. The
plaintiffs were minority holders of Brazilian debt under a syndicated
loan agreement.259 One of the other lenders in the syndicate was
Banco do Brasil ("BdB") , an instrumentality of the state .260 Brazil had
defaulted on its obligations and CIBC wished to accelerate the debt.261

2 5 3 , 1 0 9 F , 3d 850, 853·54 (2d Cir. 1 997).
254. Id. at 855 (citations omitted) .
255. 1 94 F. 3d 363 (2d Cir. 19 99) .
256. Id. at 369.
257. Id. at 380.
258. 886 F. Supp . 1 1 05 (S. D . N .Y. 1995).
259. Id. at 1 1 0 7 .
260. Id.
2 6 1 . Id .
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Through the debt holdings of BdB, however, Brazil was abl e to block
CIBC's attempt to accelerate because the contract required a vote of
more than 50 percent of the creditors and BdB owned 51 p ercent.262
Citing old intercreditor duty cases such as Hackettstown, the plaintiff
argued that the collusive arrangement between Brazil and BdB
violated the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. 2 63 The court,
however, stated that the old case law was inapplicable b ecause it
involved "compositions," that is, restructuring agreements that the
p arties make when the debtor is insolvent. 264 This case, it explained,
was about a contract dispute, and the plaintiff knew fully well at the
time of contracting with Brazil that BdB was a lender. 265 Hence, had
the lenders wanted a clause that restricted BdB from having its votes
counted, they should have asked for it at the outset. 266
The case repeats the hard line that no implied duties obtain in
respect of action explicitly authorized by the contract. 26 7 That said,
the court failed to confront the old cases and commentaries. First, it is
not clear that intercreditor duties existed only in the context of a
composItIOn or insolvency. As discussed, the language about
intercreditor duties from that period appears stronger. 2 6 8 Second,
Brazil was indee d going through a composition; Brazil had defaulte d
on its debt and had to renegotiate . The plaintiff was a minority
creditor suing under the old debt instruments because it did not want
to go along with the new plan Brazil had proposed.
C. Sum m ary

The CIBC court should have scrutinized the deal. Whether it
would have found anything is another question. Similarly, a bond
market shift from UACs to CACs should be viewed as a material
262. Id.
263. The Hachettstown decision was pointed out to the court by the p laintiffs in a
supplemental letter to the briefs. See id. at 1 1 1 5 n.8 ; see also Letter from Martin London,
Attorney, Paul Weiss Rifkind & Wharton, to Judge Loretta A Preska, U . S . District Judge (May
1, 1 995) (on file with authors) .
264. CIBC Banh & Trust Co. , 886 F. Supp. at 1 1 1 5.
265. Id. at 1 1 1 6 · 1 7 .
266. Id. a t 1 1 1 7 .
2 6 7 . Judge Preska quotes the following language from Metropolitan L ife Insurance Co. v .
RJR Nabisco, 7 1 6 F. Supp. 1 5 04, 1 5 1 7 (S . D . N .Y. 1 9 89), one o f the standard cases in modern
debtor-creditor law:
"In contracts like bond indentures, an implied covenant derives its
substance directly from the language of the Indenture, and cannot give the holders of D ebentures
any rights inconsistent with those set out in the Indenture ." CBIC BanI< & Trust Co. , 886 F .
Supp. a t 1 1 1 6 .
2 6 8 . See supra notes 234-240.
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change in circumstances j ustifying a shift to good faith scrutiny. For
endor selnent of this assertion, we look to no less an authority than the
United States Treasury.
We think the Treasury, having promoted CACs, has a
responsibility to intervene in subsequent litigation to explain the new
regime and its implications for the judicial role. There is precedent for
such intervention. In Allied Bank In ternational v . Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, Costa Rican banks had defaulted on their
obligations as the result of their government's decision to restrict
outflows of foreign exchange .269 1 70 out of 1 7 1 creditors agreed to a
composition . 2 70 The one holdout accelerated its debt .27 1 The Second
Circuit, in its first hearing of the case, and consistent with what it
perceive d to be the cre ditors' interest in an orderly restructuring of the
debt, blocked the acceleration.27 2 On rehearing en banc, however, the
Justice Department informed the court that the government's policy,
while favorably disposed to orderly restructurings, primarily favored
allowing the creditors to enforce their contracts .27 3 In other words ,
private ordering (and holdouts) were to trump the policy rationale that
had guided the court's first decision. The resulting en b anc decision of
the Second Circuit reversed the court's earlier position.27 4 This policy
position was later echoed in Judge C alabresi's opinion in Pravin
Banker275 and then again in Banco de la Nacion . 2 7 6
If the government were to m ake a similar appearance today, it
presumably would state the opposite position.277 From the public's

269. 757 F.2d 5 1 6 , 5 1 9 ( 2 d Cir. 1 985) . The Allied Ban!? decision and creditors' coordination
problem in the absence of sovereign b ankruptcy were much discussed issues in the mid· 1 980s.
See, e.g. , Stephen Bainbridge, Co mity and Sovereign Deb t Litigation: A Banhruptcy Analogy, 1 0
MD. J . INT'L L . & TRA D E 1 , 2 9 ( 1 986); Andrew C . Quale, Jr., Allied Banhs ' Effect o n In ternational
Lending, INT'L FIN. L. REV . , Aug. 1985, at 26; Ruben Sklar, Renego tiation of External Deb t: The
Allied Banh Cases Clnd the Chap ter 1 1 Analogy, 17 U. MIAMI INTER·AM . L. REV. 59 ( 1 9 84); Roger
M. Zaitzeff & C. Thomas Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and the Allied Ban!? Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
449 ( 1 985).
270. Bainbridge, supra note 269, at 2 9 .
2 7 1 . Id.
272. Allied BanI?, 7 5 7 F . 2 d at 5 1 9·20.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 5 2 3 . On Allied Banh, see Tarullo, supra note 9, at 6 7 6 and more generally,
Bainbridge, supra note 269.
275. 1 09 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1 997).
276. 194 F.3d 3 6 3 (2d Cir. 1 999).
277. See Tarullo, supra note 9, at 676 (pointing out that the Justice Department can inform a
court that the government's policy had changed (while also suggesting that it is not clear a court
would depart from the pattern of literal enforcement of debt contracts)). While the govern ment
policy in Allied Ban!? was to urge the court to allow the non cooperating creditors to sue, that
position had softened by the time of the CIBC case, where the United States government a micus
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p erspective-one where the rich countries want to avoid b ailouts and
the poor countries want to avoid the pain presently suffered by
Argentina-the goal should be to help CACs survive. If the courts fail
to police opportunistic behavior, the markets likely will move b ack to
UACs , as oppos e d to undertaking the daunting task of contracting for
more explicit goo d faith duties. The government accordingly could tell
the courts that public policy considerations point towards a default
rule of meaningful good faith intercreditor duties .
I n sum, w e proj ect that the courts could b e persuaded to turn to
the old equity receivership cases (especially if supported by an amicus
brief from the United States government) . Such scrutiny would not
prevent a majority of creditors from taking actions to enable a
restructuring of a distressed sovereign's debt. It would simply enable a
displeased ' minority creditor to ask for review of the maj ority's
m odification plan. That heightened judicial scrutiny would bring with
it heightened uncertainty and the possibility that the modification
plan will be set aside. But that is not a bad thing if creditors are
concerned about coercive modifications and the scrutiny lends comfort .
In the long run, creditors who feel safer will be more willing to lend.
We are left with two sets of solutions at different ends of the
spectrum. Under the prevailing weak good faith doctrine, the maj ority
of creditors under a CAC can use modification terms to solve the
holdout problem . The problem is the risk of oppressive maj ority action.
The result is the bondholders' preference for UACs , which in turn
creates the holdout problem. To persuade creditors to move to, and
stay with, the use of CACs, they need a substitute for the protections
that UACs otherwise provide them . Key among these protections are
good faith duties.
One solution would be to include these gap -filling duties within
a new statutory b ankruptcy scheme for sovereigns. There are reasons
for preferring a statutory scheme over contractual modification.27 8
But the only plausible statutory scheme on the table today is that of
the IMF and neither the creditors , the debtors, nor the Unite d States
Treasury want anything to do with it . 2 7 9 That means that the most

brief expressed concern about the actions of vulture creditors. See Charles D. Schmerler,
L i t igating Defau lts on Souereign Debt Law, Policy S truggle to Defer to Fo reign States While
Honoring Lenders ' Rights, N .Y. L.J., Apr. 15, 2002, at S l .

2 7 8. See, e.g. , David A. Skeel, J r . , Can Majority Vot i ng Pro u isions Do It All, 52 EMORY L.J.
4 1 7 (2003) .
279. See, e.g. , Miller, supra note 1 , at 1 84, 1 96-97 (describing the United States Treasury's
views on CACs, where although the United States prefers CACs to the SDRM, it serves its
purposes to keep the threat of the SDRM open so as to induce the markets to try CACs) ; A Better
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likely solution will be a move to CACs under New York contract
law . 2 80 For that solution to remain stable, the courts interpreting
these contracts need to read implied duties into the contracts .
VI. CONCLUSION
When a policymaker from Washington asks a bondholder to
exchange her UAC bond for a new bond with a CAC , the bondholder
will be suspicious. "Policy," after all, often means a loss of value
inflicte d to advance someone else's agenda. Recent debate s in
Washington do not allay such suspicions . The talk centers on ways to
make sure that, when help is extende d , none of it comes the
bondholders' way. At a time when the value of the bondholders'
investments has plummeted, institutions not known to make sacrifices
themselves sternly lecture the bondholders on the need to take less. In
such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that the bondholders resist
reform.
If the policymakers expect the bondholders to exchange UACs
for CACs , they will have to allay their fears . This accommodation
could come in the form of money, but there is no money. We offer
several second best solutions. First, the policy makers need to
emphasize that sovereign bondholders reasonably can be asked to
make give ups only as a means to the end of creating surpluses. Then
the policymakers need to state that the fair division of those surpluses
is their top policy priority. To make that statement credible, they need
to confront the deficit in legal protection. When compared to their
corporate counterparts , sovereign creditors already have fewer
To delimit these p rotections without providing a
protections . 2 8 1
credible substitute creates the risk that the creditors will take their
money and play elsewhere. 28 2

Way to Go Bust, supra note 1 3 , at 64 (reporting that "most financiers, whether bankers or
bondholders, loathe the SDRM") , available at 2003 WL 6 2 4 4 8 1 7 .
280. See Miller, supra note 1 , a t 1 84, 196·97.
281. See SHLEIFER, s upra note 2, at 5· 10.
282. See i d . at 4·5 (reviewing evidence showing that where creditor and shareholder rights
receive more protection, investment levels are higher a n d markets are thicker) .

